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I
INTRODUCTION

In 1940, the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and
the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") put forth their 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.' In the half century since its
original issuance, the 1940 Statement has become well known in higher
education in the United States, and its principles of academic freedom are
widely observed. It has been incorporated expressly or by reference into
many faculty handbooks in American colleges and universities, endorsed by
more than one hundred national learned and professional associations, and
relied upon in a number of state and federal courts. It is, overall, the general
norm of academic practice in the United States.
As a general legal proposition, however, the 1940 Statement is an example
of very soft law. Generally speaking, the 1940 Statement is not policed by
courts. Rather, it is policed principally by Committee A of the AAUP 2 and by
publication of AAUP's ad hoc committee investigation case reports in the
AAUP's professional journal. And while this may understate the 1940
Statement's influence in some respects (for example, as when a university has
adopted it and made it part of the faculty's contractual guarantee), the 1940
Statement is certainly not hard law in the ultimate sense one differently
associates, say, with the first amendment to the Constitution with its general
protection of free speech. That fixed constitutional provision, even if limited
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Past President and
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1. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure ("1940 Statement") in Policy
Documents and Reports 3 (AAUP, 1984) ("1984 Red Book"); see Appendix B, 53 L & Contemp Probs
407 (Summer 1990).
2. For an explanation of the function of Committee A, see generally Louis Joughin, ed,
Academic Freedom and Tenure: .AHandbook of the American Association of University Professors (Univ of Wis
Press, 1967).
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to acts of government, as it is, 3 is at the opposite end of the legal order from

the precatory law of the AAUP and AAC. In comparison with the soft law of
the 1940 Statement, the first amendment is hard law indeed. The 1940
Statement instructs institutions of higher education respecting the kind of
disposition they ought, in the opinion of the Statement's sponsoring and
endorsing learned societies, to take toward academic freedom. As already
noted, however, the 1940 Statement generally requires affirmative
institutional action of some sort to carry its provisions into legal effect (for
example, incorporation by reference into college or university bylaws, into
letters of faculty appointment, or collective bargaining agreements). No such
step is required in respect to the first amendment, of course. The Bill of

Rights, including the first amendment, is quite different from the 1940
Statement. The first amendment is, after all, part of our fundamental law.
Compliance, therefore, is not optional; its protections are enforceable in
every court in the United States.
Even so, the first amendment is in its own way very much like the 1940
Statement: the first amendment's immediate use value is in large measure
derived from the case law that has grown up around it, as has happened also
with the 1940 Joint Statement and Committee A. What the courts understand
the first amendment to say, rather than what one may otherwise suppose it
provides, tends necessarily to occupy the main ground in working through its
various applications and use. Given the role courts have occupied in the
American constitutional order at least since Marbury v. Madison 4 was decided
in 1803, the case law of the first amendment provides the basic, though not
exclusive, road map in tending to guide first amendment disputes. The
AAUP's Committee A case law (that is, the very large body of published case
3. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." As suggested by its language, the first amendment is not addressed to the states. The
Supreme Court confirmed that impression in 1833. Barron v Mayor and City Council, 32 US (7 Pet)
243, 247-51 (1833) (The Bill of Rights was proposed and ratified as a set of affirmative restrictions on
the national government only; it has no application to the states.). With the ratification of the 14th
amendment in 1868, arguments came to be advanced that the 14th amendment incorporated some
of the protections the Bill of Rights had furnished against the national government as restraints
equally binding thereafter on the states. (For one recent and elaborate review of this subject, see
Michael K. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Duke Univ
Press, 2d ed 1987)). In 1925, the Supreme Court accepted that view in respect to the first
amendment, in dicta. Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925). In 1931, the identification of the
full free speech and free press clause to the due process clause of the 14th amendment was employed
by the Court to hold invalid a state law. See Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 701-33 (1931). See also
Dejonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 356-66 (1937). Since that date, the 14th and first amendments have
been treated by the Supreme Court as framing parallel, binding restrictions on the national and state
governments, although neither by itself applies to private entities not operating as agencies of the
state.
4. 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury affirmed the Supreme Court's pivotal role in applying
the Constitution, much as Bishop Hoadley had addressed the pivotal role of judges in England in his
sermon preached before the King in 1717 ("Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first spoke or wrote them."). See William B. Lockhart, et al, ConstitutionalLaw: CasesComments-Questions I (West, 6th ed 1986).
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reports that used to appear in the AA UP Bulletin and that now appear in the
AAUP's publication Academe) has functioned informally in an equivalent
fashion in respect to the 1940 Statement. This informal case law has provided
specific clarification and application of that fifty-year-old, two-page
declaration. Roughly speaking, albeit of course at a much softer level of
authority, Committee A has provided the guiding case law of academic
freedom identified with the 1940 Statement comparable to that provided by
the Supreme Court.
However, there is no reason a priori to expect these two bodies of case law
to share any substantial common ground. Rather, the more reasonable
assumption would be that the Supreme Court case law of the first amendment
and the informal Committee A case law of the 1940 Statement would move
along separate, even if roughly parallel, paths: the first dealing with large
matters of free speech, government censorship, and government power to
punish what people say, the second dealing with academic freedom as a tight
bundle of interests distinct unto itself. In fact, however, this is not quite true.
Rather, while the first amendment and the 1940 Statement are indeed
differently grounded, their case law has tended very substantially to overlap.
In fact, a large portion of the previously purely soft law of academic freedom
has found a niche in the hard law of the Constitution through the usages of
academic freedom in the Supreme Court. It is this process we shall shortly
follow in an unhurried review.
Beyond this major, largely post-World War II development, moreover, the
Supreme Court has also taken some of the values narrowly represented in the
1940 Statement and expanded upon them in a variety of ways. For example,
the 1940 Statement addressed itself to academic freedom as an imperative in
higher education. Consistent with some trends in first amendment case law,
however, academic freedom has secured some purchase for public school
teachers as well. As a different example, whereas "academic freedom" is
defined in the 1940 Statement as the "[fireedom of teaching" (and of faculty
research and faculty extramural activities of certain kinds), 5 some Court
decisions speak of academic freedom in respect to students, and not solely
those who teach. As still a third example, although academic freedom is
usually treated (in the 1940 Statement) as a matter of individual freedom,
usually that of individual teachers to address matters of professional interest
without threat to their jobs, 6 some Court decisions apply a first amendment
notion of academic freedom much more corporately, that is, to the university
or the college as an entity. The university, it is thought, may claim a certain
corporate academic freedom to set its own institutional course-in
5. Of which more mention will be made later on. See, for example, note 112 and
accompanying text.
6. The standard dictionary definition is of this sort. See, for example, American Heritage
Dictionar, 70 (Houghton-Mifflin, 1985) ("academic freedom" defined as: "Liberty to pursue and
teach relevant knowledge and to discuss it freely without restriction from school or public officials or
from other sources of influence").
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curriculum, in admissions, in appointments-sheltered from government to
some degree as a matter of constitutional (academic freedom) right.
Conversely, however, even in respect to these examples, the pathway of
academic freedom's definitional development has tended to be a two-way
street; in some measure these developments have taken place equally within
the AAUP as within the doctrines of the Supreme Court. So, for instance,
while the AAUP has not attempted to police its newer Joint Statement in the
same case law investigating-and-reporting manner Committee A employs for
the 1940 Statement (its resources are too limited to do so), the AAUP
nonetheless did help fashion a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students in 1967. 7 So, too, the AAUP has involved itself in matters of
institutional academic freedom and diversity, and has appeared a substantial
number of times to support the claims of first amendment academic freedom
by public school teachers. The AAUP's own notions of the varieties of
academic freedom, like the notions of the Supreme Court, have become more
complex over time. Indeed, the AAUP's Policy Documents and Reports, the "Red
Book" (its collection of basic policy statements and documents), addresses a
far broader range of subjects than those just touched upon. The Red Book
currently collects 179 pages of policy statements and documents:

177 pages

more, that is, than the original two-page 1940 Statement presumed to do.
The phrase "academic freedom" has thus become one of extended usage for
the AAUP as well as for courts interpreting and applying the first amendment
during the past half century or so.
Nonetheless, it is principally the latter-the usages of academic freedom in

the Supreme Court-we mean to trace, rather than the formulations of the
AAUP. To do that most usefully, however, we do not begin with the Supreme
Court's modern decisions, but with its past decisions. Not by chance, they are
linked to the origins of the AAUP.
II
LINKING ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT:

A

SHORT,

HISTORICAL SKETCH

A
At the turn of the twentieth century, the first amendment was virtually in a
state of pre-history so far as academic freedom was concerned.

Indeed,

academic freedom to one side, the first amendment had no real immediate
significance for free speech in general, never mind anything more specialized
or arcane as Lehrfreiheit ("freedom to teach") or Lernfreiheit ("freedom to
learn"), in the United States.
The first amendment had no general bite in 1900 because of the American
judiciary's extremely cramped view of the amendment's scope. Despite its
unqualifiedly strong language ("Congress shall make no law abridging the
7. AAUP et alJointStatement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, in Policly Documents and Reports 153
(AAUP, 1990) ("1967 Statement"); see Appendix C, 53 L & Contemp Probs 411 (Summer 1990).
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freedom of speech or of the press" 8 ), the amendment was deemed to furnish
no more than fig leaf protection from anything other than certain kinds of
governmentally imposed licensing or permit systems. In a word, the
amendment applied almost solely to some few forms of prior restraint.
The prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence of the first amendment
amounted to little more than a restatement of William Blackstone's
eighteenth century Commentaries on the Laws of England,9 predating the
Constitution and the first amendment. Blackstone, summarizing the common
law of the eighteenth century, reported approvingly that restrictions on
speech having any bad tendency in the view of public authority were quite
commonplace. Other than restrictions involving some sort of press licensing
system of the sort abandoned in England in 1691, Blackstone noted, it was
thought to be pretty much up to Parliament and the customs of England to
decide what kinds of speech might or might not be allowed. In a word, the
freedom of the press (and so, too, of speech) was its freedom from having to
satisfy crown censors. It was not a freedom from criminal or civil sanctions,
imposed after the fact in light of the scandal of one's actual remarks.
Most judicial interpretations of the first amendment adhered sedulously to
Blackstone-they enacted Blackstone's Commentaries into constitutional law.
The usual judicial assumption was that the freedom of speech and of the press
that the first amendment protected from abridgments by Congress was merely
that freedom familiarly allowed at common law and nothing more. This view
is accurately captured in a much-quoted dictum by Justice Holmes, writing for
the Supreme Court in 1907: "[T]he main purpose of such constitutional
provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." '0 This extremely
narrow interpretation of the first amendment (and, incidentally, equally of the
fourteenth amendment-it is the latter that is applicable to the states), left the
amendment practically useless. And so far as academic freedom might be an
issue as a subset of freedom of speech, there was even more to be discouraged
about.
The additional source of discouragement developed separately from a
strand of constitutional analysis specially applicable to employment
relationships, including public employment (that is, employment by the state).
All employers were deemed to be unconstrained by the Constitution insofar
as they might require that one suspend one's freedom of speech as a
8. Compare, for example, US Const, 4th amend (forbidding only unreasonable searches and
seizures). In most constitutions that contain free speech and free press clauses, the rights are heavily
qualified. See, for example, article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution (second oldest after the
United States Constitution, adopted in 1814) (freedom of publication protected unless it expresses
"contempt of religion [or] morality," in which case it is not).
9. See Edward Christian, ed, Blackstone's Commentaries, Book 4 (Of Public Wrongs) 150-53
(Robert H. Small, 1825).
10. Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454, 462 (1907) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis
added).
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condition of holding an appointment or job. The law (that is, the body of
constitutional law applicable to this subject) was only too clear: when a
speech restriction limiting what one might say or write was set forth in
advance as a condition of one's employment, it was not thought to raise a first
amendment question at all. One was free to accept the position or not, on the
terms offered; if one accepted, one was accordingly bound.
This view, too, is reflected in a case decided by Holmes in 1892, while he
was still serving on the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Dismissing the appeal
of a New Bedford policeman who had been fired following some public
remarks critical of how the department was run, Holmes drew a distinction
that was to have a lasting effect:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as
of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. II

Holmes hedged only trivially on the distinction. In dicta, he suggested
that ifthe conditions thus imposed incidentally to public employment were
unreasonable in some extreme sense (that is, that the conditions seemed
utterly gratuitous), the courts might intervene on substantive due process
grounds. Seldom, however, would that extreme instance be deemed to have
occurred; indeed, Holmes gave no example of what he had in mind.
Plainly, these views and precedents would leave any claim of mere
academic freedom stranded as a constitutional matter; indeed, they left
freedom of speech stranded at large. And, in fact, these views of the first and
fourteenth amendments carried over for decades into the twentieth century,
as a large number of cases would show.
Blackstone's bad tendency test held sway under the first amendment until
well after World War 1.12 The add-on employment waiver rationale was
applied by the courts until well after World War II.13 It will serve our
purpose here to note one famous case particularly on point-the original
Scopes Monkey Trial case 14 in which Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield
Hayes argued quite vainly on the constitutional issue in the Tennessee
Supreme Court in 1927.
At issue in Scopes was whetherJohn Scopes, a Tennessee public high school
teacher, could be fined or jailed for teaching "any theory that denieid] the
story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible," in violation of a
state statute governing his conduct as a teacher in the Tennessee public
schools.' 5 Could he discuss the theory that man may have developed not all
11.
12.

McAuliffv Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 NE 517, 518 (1892).
For a useful review, see generally David M. Rabban, The First Amendment inItsForgotten Years,

90 Yale LJ 514 (1981).
13. See, for example, Bailey v Richardson, 182 F2d 46 (DC Cir 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 US 918 (1951).
14. Scopes v State, 154 Tenn 105, 289 SW 363 (1927).
15. 154 Tenn at 108, 289 SW at 364. The statute, incidentally, was not limited to public school
teachers. Rather, it applied to "all the Universities, Normals and all other public schools supported in
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at once in perfect form, as a creation of God, but over time, from earlier life
forms through the cumulative effects of mutation, reproduction, and natural
selection, as Darwin had proposed? The statute gave fair warning that he

could not. Violations, moreover, were punishable as a crime (apart from
providing grounds for dismissal).

Scopes was duly convicted and fined

following a full jury trial.
Scopes' criminal conviction was in fact reversed in the state supreme court
because of a technical sentencing error committed in the trial court; since
Scopes agreed to leave the state, there was no subsequent reprosecution or
appeal. But in reversing, the Tennessee Supreme Court left no doubt about
the futility of arguing any constitutional objections to the act, whether as

applied to a public school teacher or to a state university professor:
[Scopes] was under contract with the State to work in an institution of the State. He
had no right or privilege to serve the State except upon such terms as the State
prescribed. His liberty, his privilege, his immunity to teach and proclaim the theory of
evolution, elsewhere than in the service of the State, was in no wise touched by this
law.
The Statute before us is not an exercise of the police power of the State
undertaking to regulate the conduct and contracts of individuals in their dealings with
each other.[ 16 ] On the other hand it is an Act of the State as a corporation, a
proprietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of work the
master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with its own employees
engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of ... the
7

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.'

Between the general bad tendency test on the one hand, and the
additional doctrine represented by Scopes (that the state is not hampered by
the fourteenth amendment in directing the work of its appointees and staff),
very little by way of protected free speech was left unaccounted for, to say
nothing of academic freedom as such. To be sure, as we have noted, private
schools and private universities (that is, those not receiving public monies)
could choose to provide for something roughly called "academic freedom," if
they wished. That would be up to them.' 8 But even insofar as it was up to
them, obviously the issue would turn on trustee tolerance-to control or not
control what its faculty might do-and nothing else. It was not a matter of
first amendment law.
whole or in part" by public funds. Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act, 1925 Tenn Pub Acts 27 (emphasis
added).
16. If the statute had been extended to reach teachers in private schools and private colleges,
however, it is not clear they would have fared any better than Scopes in a free speech claim.
Remember that at this time the first amendment standard ofjudicial review would require the court
to examine the restrictive state law solely under the prevailing bad tendency test. Under that test the
state would need to show only that some not unreasonable view of public welfare would be advanced
by forbidding such teaching, whether or not it was acceptable to the private school or college. But
see Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), and Bartels v Iowa, 262 US 404 (1923) (further discussed in
notes 24-33 and accompanying text).
17. Scopes, 154 Tenn at 109-12, 289 SW at 364-65 (emphasis and brackets added).
18. Under the prevailing bad tendency first amendment test, however, and despite the dicta of
the Tennessee Supreme Court, even this statement may be too broad. See the brief discussion in
note 16.
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B
Throughout this period, however, significant developments in shaping
academic freedom nonetheless took place. What academic freedom required
was some compelling justification, at least as a strongly defensible
professional imperative in higher education, even if (perhaps especially if)
there was no immediate prospect of finding support in hard law.
Part of that case had already been made over decades, indeed over
centuries, of course; in some measure academic freedom was already reflected
in the practices of a number of institutions in the United States. Part of it was
developed with a new spirit from the impact of writings such as John Stuart
Mill's already classic Essay on Liberty 19 published in 1859, whose chapter on
"Liberty of Thought and Discussion" would eventually also influence the
Supreme Court. Part could be (and was) adapted from earlier sources (for
example, "The Areopagitica," 20 Milton's essay of 1643, urging the usefulness
of permitting "truth and falsehood" to grapple without press censorship), and
even earlier discourses on the freedom of the mind as well.
But freedom of the mind and freedom of speech had always had their
limits, as Milton as well as Blackstone noted (and approved), including limits
public bodies enacted for reasons they deemed socially worthwhile. If
writings such as Mill's were felt to be interesting and provocative, many also
thought them naive and oblivious to other interests that might more dearly
matter. To many, moreover, there seemed little reason to grant academics
more latitude than anyone else. As Glenn Morrow was to explain years later:
The justification of academic freedom cannot be based merely on the right to freedom
of thought and expression enjoyed by all citizens of a liberal society, for academic
freedom implies immunity to some natural consequences of free speech that the
ordinary citizen does not enjoy ....

The justification of academic freedom must

therefore be sought in the
peculiar character and function of the university scholar [if
2
it is to be found at all]. '

In the general view of freedom of speech, one will recall, the bad tendency
test was applied. Insofar as trustees, philanthropists, and others concerned
with colleges and universities-whether private or public-might feel a duty
to disallow teaching, research, or publication contrary to common notions of
truth, faith, order, and good taste, nothing in general legal philosophy or first
amendment jurisprudence provided any reason for self-restraint. There was,
that is, very little reason to accept any self-denying ordinance of
noninterference, whether one was a legislator or a trustee. To stand aloof in
either role might merely imply an effete indifference to the public good.
Viewed this way, noninterference would constitute the irresponsible stance.
An answering rationale needed to come, as Morrow suggested, from an
enlarged notion of what one deems to be the public good of a university,
19.

1935).
20.
21.

See Philip Wheelwright, ed,Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, J.S, Mill: Selected Writings (Doubleday,

See Don W. Wolfe, ed, 2 Complete Prose Works (Yale Univ Press, 1982).
Glenn R. Morrow, Academic Freedom, in David L. Sills, ed, InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social

Sciences 4, 6 (MacMillan & Free Press, 1968).
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whether public or private: that is, of what a university should be doing, and
what defines the duties (never mind the rights) of its faculty. Borrowed only
partly from English universities, the developments being shaped gained
ground in the United States more substantially from the example of particular
German research institutes, in which a number of American scholars received
their graduate education and in which Lehrfreiheit was already an established
22
and familiar term.
A faculty, especially a research faculty, is employed professionally to test
and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom, not to inculcate the
prevailing wisdom in others, store it as monks might do, or rewrite it in
elegant detail. Its function is primarily one of critical review: to check
conventional truth, to reexamine ("re-search") what may currently be thought
sound but may be more or less unsound. Its purpose is likewise to train
others to the same critical skills. Such a faculty inquires-as an obvious sort
of example-whether original and seemingly authoritative sources have been
mistranslated or misunderstood. Such a faculty likewise labors to enlarge the
field of experimental data and to make itself useful by publishing the results.
It seeks through its own sets of disciplines and conventions to examine its own
culture's characteristics as well as those of other societies, past and present,
even as an outsider would be prepared to examine them, that is, without
special affection or predisposition of the sort likely to cloud the integrity of
the work. Its successes in these endeavors are the measure of its chief work,
and also of its most important social assignment. This is what a professional
faculty is meant to do. Much like the office of devil's advocate within a church
(that, while faithful, desires also not to confer sainthood unrigorously and so
charges someone to check itself from error), universities are licensed truthhunters defined and bound by academic freedom. As Arthur Lovejoy (a
founder of the AAUP in 1913) observed in the 1930 edition of the
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, the ultimate social good of a university "is
rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shackled by the
requirement that his conclusions shall never seriously deviate from generally
accepted beliefs or from those accepted by the persons, private or official,
through whom society provides the means for the maintenance of
universities."

23

22. See Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom in the United
States 377-407 (Columbia Univ Press, 1955); Charles Franklin Thwing, The American and the German
University: One Hundred Years of History ch 3 (Macmillan, 1928); Leo Rockwell, Academic Freedom:
German Origin and American Development, 36 AAUP Bull 225-36 (1950). " 'Lehrfreiheit' meant that
associate and full professors, who were salaried government officials working in universities
supported by the state . . . could determine the contents of their courses and impart the findings of
their inquiries without seeking ministerial approval or fearing ministerial reproof." Matthew W.
Finkin, On "Institutional"AcademicFreedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817, 822 (1983), quoting Walter P. Metzger.
23. More than a half century later, in the spring of 1988, the House of Lords adopted a bill
defining academic freedom in a manner closely fitting Lovejoy's rationale ("academic freedom"
proposed for the protection of teachers as "freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom,
and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in
jeopardy of losing theirjobs or privileges") (emphasis added). David Walker, In a Rare Rebellion, British
Lords Demand Academic-Freedom Law, in Chron Higher Educ Al, A43, col 3 (June 1, 1988). Compare
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Before this claim of vocational freedom could be coupled with the first and
fourteenth amendments, however, a number of things needed to change. For
one thing, the flaccidness of the prevailing first amendment bad tendency test
would require overhaul, as would the master/servant metaphor. These
changes eventually did occur (we shall shortly note how and when), but before
they did, a separate development in constitutional case law took hold. We
turn first to this sidebar development before resuming the tracery of first
amendment doctrine in the Supreme Court. We do so because the first serious
Supreme Court protection of what one might now consider academic freedom
did not arise out of the first amendment at all. Rather, it came from the
judicial application of pre-existing legal doctrines. The partial deliverance of
academic freedom came at the hands of an activist, conservative Supreme
Court defending private options against the state.
In 1920, a number of midwestern state legislatures moved to stem what
they regarded as the regrettable tendency of youngsters from immigrant
families to learn and speak only a foreign language rather than English. Iowa
and Nebraska were among these states, and each by general statute in 1919
forbade any school instruction in any language other than English before the
eighth grade.
The two cases reaching the Supreme Court testing these laws differed
from Scopes, however, in that the Iowa and Nebraska laws did not limit the
teaching restriction solely to the public schools; rather, they mandated
English-only instruction in all private schools as well. Both cases in fact
involved criminal conviction of men who taught reading German in private
24
Lutheran schools: Robert Myer in Nebraska and August Bartels in Iowa.
The Scopes rationale, dismissing Scopes as a mere employee confined to do the
state's work on such terms as the state might decide (as master to servant), did
not apply. Rather, the cases were as Scopes might have been had Scopes been
a teacher in a private school, proceeding exactly as the school employed him
to do, though not as the state legislature wished.
The Nebraska and Iowa statutes were not impugned on grounds of
interfering with Meyer's or Bartels' first or fourteenth amendment freedom of
speech, however. Nor is it easy to see how they might have been cast as free
speech claims, since neither Meyer nor Bartels was affected other than as a
teacher, that is, as a person for hire, furnishing foreign language instruction,
Lovejoy's definition in Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed, I EncYclopaedia of the Social Sciences 384 (Macmillan,
1930):
Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his
conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without
interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of
the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of
his own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.
24. See Teaching of Foreign Languages in the State of Nebraska, 1919 Neb Laws 249; Iowa
Language Act, 1919 Iowa Acts 198; Meyer, 262 US at 397; Bartels, 262 US at 409.
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albeit in a privately operated school. As of the date of these cases, moreover,
the Supreme Court had not even held that the first amendment necessarily
applied to the states as distinct from its application to acts of Congress. That
decision, identifying freedom of speech as a specific liberty equally protected
against state action by the fourteenth amendment, did not come until 1925,
incidental to a political sedition prosecution, Gitlow v. New York. 2 5 Even after
2
Gitlow, the Court still continued to apply the mere bad tendency test.

6

The free speech clause was not relied upon in either case; neither did
Meyer or Bartels successfully challenge the statutes on the ground that they
interfered with the free exercise of religion, even though the laws dictated
instructional practices of religious (Lutheran) schools. In the particular
circumstances, however, it was difficult to make a free exercise claim, for in
neither case was it alleged that giving or receiving instruction in German was
27
a requirement of Lutheran faith.

The emphasis in both Meyer and Bartels was, rather, on substantive due
process principles generally. 28 The Court summed up the collective effects of
the Iowa and Nebraska statutes: their restriction against any private school
offering any program of foreign language instruction to any student prior to
the eighth grade; their antivocational restriction of teachers like Meyer and
Bartels, now cut off from fulfilling teaching contracts willingly entered into by
the private schools; their effective foreclosure of families from choosing any
school able to teach their children anything in their own language before the
eighth grade. And to what end? Certainly not as a necessary means of
assuring an adequate facility in English, since that might be done by less
draconian means.2 9 The unnecessary excess of the states' laws, merely in
order to assure basic English literacy,30 was deemed to be unwarranted by any
25. 268 US 652 (1925).
26. In brief, in Gitlow the Court did make the connection firming up the equivalence of 14th and
first amendment protection; but the majority nonetheless affirmed the particular defendant's
criminal conviction (by applying the first amendment's mere bad tendency test).
27. As a matter of historical interest, the first case presenting such an additional and successful
claim of "free exercise" of religion did arise a few years later in Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510
(1925), where the Court relied partly on the religious freedom clause to invalidate the particular state
law. In Pierce, the Court held that parents cannot be compelled to enroll their children in public,
rather than parochial, schools providing additional religious instruction-assuming only that the
parochial school meets reasonable minimum state educational and safety standards.
28. See also Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284, 298-99 (1927) (Meyer and Bartels applied in
behalf of private schools similarly restricted in a federal territory, Hawaii, citing the due process
clause of the fifth amendment and treating it substantively the same as the due process clause of the
14th amendment, in Mever.).
29. Note that the laws altogether closed off an entire area of learning freedom (Lernfreiheit) at a
single stroke. The statutes did not seek their objective affirmatively, for example, by providing that
children be suitably tested for English and given remedial instruction if found deficient. Rather, they
operated by forbidding any foreign language instruction prior to the eighth grade, period, whether
one already was well versed in English or not. See 1919 Neb Laws 249; 1919 Iowa Acts 198 (cited in
note 24).
30. Following so shortly on World War I, these laws were also very possibly driven in part by an
anti-German animus and not solely by an unalloyed solicitude for the educational welfare of
immigrant family children.
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proper police power interest. The Court reversed the criminal convictions of
Meyer and Bartels.
Meyer and Bartels mark an important first boundary in our review of
academic freedom. They do so by distinguishing between what the state may
decide to do in its own financing (that is, its administration of public, taxfurnished educational resources) and what it may not necessarily forbid at
large. The foundation of the decision was not the first amendment, but the
cases are still vital to the autonomy (and academic freedom) of private
31
universities and schools.
Principally, the Court relied upon the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, 3 2 in
which it had likewise intervened against police power claims of the welfare
state. Lochner was a decision that many regarded as both infamous and wrong
(Holmes dissented in Lochner, but then he also dissented in Meyer and in
Bartels). Perhaps it was, yet its standard of judicial review is critical in Meyer
and well worth taking into account.
In Lochner, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law forbidding
employment of persons in private commercial bakeries for more than ten
hours each day. The Court struck down the law as a violation of the right of
employees and employers to decide such matters for themselves At the time
it was decided, Lochner was widely condemned as a judicial embrace of social
Darwinism. In subsequent decades, moreover, judges practically vied with
one another in denouncing its allegedly procapitalist view of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 33 What is relevant about the Lochner
reference in Meyer, however, is the strong view it reflects respecting the role of
the judiciary in applying the fourteenth amendment to protect private choice
and personal liberty from the general tendency of the public welfare state.
Absent that strong view of the Court's role in protecting private liberty under
the fourteenth amendment, neither Meyer nor Bartels would have been decided
as they were. Rather, the criminal convictions of Meyer and Bartels would
have been sustained, exactly as Justice Holmes voted to do.
Although the measure of judicial review in Meyer ("activist" or
"interventionist" review, as it is sometimes dismissively described) was drawn
from Lochner, it would be a mistake to consider Meyer merely as of a piece with
Lochner, that is, as an example of the social Darwinist thought that had already
31. See also the interesting thesis of Robert Bork in his book, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 47-49 (Free Press, 1990) (proposing a first amendment perspective for
Meyer v Nebraska insofar as the state law may have sought "to prevent the teaching of ideas not
officially approved"). A noted conservative nominee to the Supreme CourtJudge Bork was opposed
because his professional views of correct constitutional interpretation would repudiate the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence of "substantive due process," and therefore presumably leave state
governments unimpeded in enacting laws of the sort held invalid in MNe er. As his brief comments on
Meyer may suggest (in this lengthy book replying to his critics), depending on the perspective one
brings to the first amendment as a separate and sometimes subtle constraint on government power to
induce academic conformity, the assumption may have been quite unsound.
32. 198 US 45 (1905).
33. See generally Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Rebunal, 1962 Sup Ct Rev 34.
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led the Court to invalidate a large number of economic and social regulations
in general. Aspects of Meyer have endured long after the demise of Lochner.
They have developed separately, as a major element in academic freedom
cases in the United States, though the Lochner profile of judicial review (in
second-guessing economic regulations) under the fourteenth amendment has
generally been abandoned by the Court.
The continuing issue foreshadowed in Meyer is the issue we noted earlier:
what useful constitutional limitations are there, if any, that constrain
government from superimposing its will on educational institutions to
prescribe who shall (or shall not) be admitted, what shall (and shall not) be
studied, and who may (and may not) teach in private as well as in public
institutions? Meyer by no means settled that large question. It did, however,
take the question seriously, that is, the Court submitted it to active,
toughminded, substantive due process review. Moreover, at one place in its
brief opinion, the Meyer majority turned to the point directly. It noticed the
similarity of the laws at issue to the authoritarianism laid down in Plato's
Republic: classifying the young, removing each from any family preference
respecting their education, and rearing them in the image of (that is, for the
best needs of) the state. In terms of academic freedom, Meyer v. Nebraska is
even today a front-line constitutional case.
Indeed, Meyer is worthy of immediate juxtaposition with an earlier case in
which its strong reasoning was not applied, Berea College v. Kentucky, decided by
the Supreme Court in 1908.3 4 The decision affecting Berea College reflected
no Court "activism." The state was allowed to have its way.
In the legislation that precipitated Berea College, the State of Kentucky
asserted a police power interest "to preserve race identity" (the words are the
5
state's own; I quote from the summary of its argument before the Court).A It
legislated that interest, first, by providing for racially separate public schools,
then, as to private schools and colleges, by providing that each could admit
either white or negro students, but not both.
As in Meyer, counsel for Berea College did not address the state law as
applied to the public schools. What the state might do in structuring public
education was not at issue (nor could it have been at the time, given the state
of equal protection law prior to Brown v. Board of Education,36 still nearly a half
century away). Rather, the college stressed its separate claims as an
educational institution: to determine its own policies, unprepossessingly, as it
wished. It likewise stressed the claims of the teachers who chose to teach
there, and of its students, who evidently preferred to enroll there, not despite
but because of what it was. In short, in all salient respects, the college's
position was strikingly similar to the position later (and successfully) advanced
in Meyer. In modern terms, it would be called a strong institutional academic
freedom claim: an institutional freedom to provide such standards of
34.
35.
36.

211 US 45 (1908).
Id at 51.
349 US 294 (1954).
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admission, curriculum, and instruction as the faculty and college feel most
worthy to offer those willing to seek its education, notwithstanding the state's
wish to compel it to conform.
In Berea College, unlike Meyer, the Supreme Court gave the college's
fourteenth amendment appeal short shrift. It sustained the state law,
requiring Berea College to admit student only on the terms the state
suggested, or to close its doors. As in his dissent in Meyer, Justice Holmes
agreed, altogether consistently with his dour general view that neither the first
nor the fourteenth amendment meant very much.
Berea College did, however, yield a dissent that is worth quoting. Justice
Harlan (with Justice Day concurring in his dissent) took strong exception to
the majority's weak view of the fourteenth amendment. His dissent in Berea
College reads this way: "I am under the opinion that in its essential parts the
statute is an arbitrary invasion of the rights of liberty and property guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action and is, therefore,
7

void." 3

Harlan then went on to say:

The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the Almighty for beneficent
purposes and its use may not be forbidden or interfered with by Governmentcertainly not, unless such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or
imperils the public safety. . . . If pupils, of whatever race-certainly, if they be
citizens--choose with the consent of their parents, or voluntarily, to sit together in a
private institution of learning while receiving instruction which is not in its nature
harmful or dangerous to the public, no government, whether Federal or state, can
legally forbid their
coming together, or being together temporarily, for such an
38
innocent purpose.

At the same timeJustice Harlan distinguished the difference of public schools
on the then conventional rationale: "Of course what I have said has no
reference to regulations prescribed, for public schools, established at the
pleasure of the State and maintained at the public expense."-3 9
Even given its date (and the general state of fourteenth amendment law of
that time), Berea College was a devastating decision. What the state insisted on
in respect to admission and educational practice in public schools and
colleges, the Court held, it could impose on others, foreclosing them from
pursuing their own educational principles and ethical norms. This was not
the judicial philosophy reflected in Meyer. Indeed, between the very different
attitudes toward state power reflected by Meyer and by Berea College, there is no
common principle obviously at work. Meyer provided an outpost of
professional and institutional academic freedom Berea College was altogether
denied. We shall have occasion to return to the general theme of Meyer. In
the meantime, we need to pick up where we were.

37.
38.
39.

211 US at 67.
Id at 67-68.
Id at 69.
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D
To recapitulate briefly, we had noted, first, that successful academic
freedom claims did not develop naturally or easily as an incident of early
twentieth century first amendment doctrine. Rather, they developed largely
without benefit of the first amendment, generally under private auspices and
in response to the vacuum of doctrine associated with the first amendment as
hard law. Second, we noted that beginning in 1913, the AAUP sought to gain
some purchase against the law by pressing forward with the idea of the
university as an institution necessarily characterized by academic freedom, in
other words, in which academic freedom is inseparable from academic work.
From then on, the AAUP sought to advance this characterization of higher
education in the United States. And in significant measure, that effort
succeeded, even while the law of the Constitution tended to lag behind.
Nevertheless, even in the 1920s, two constitutional developments
(additional to Meyer) did take place in the Supreme Court, each of which was
to have major effects we will trace to the present. The first was the
development of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"; the second was
the defection of Justice Holmes (and Justice Brandeis) from the bad tendency
test in favor of a more robust view of the first amendment.
1. The Collateral Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions. The basic doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is straightforward. Professor Tribe states it
succinctly: "The . .. doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions' holds that
government may not condition the receipt of its benefits upon the
nonassertion of constitutional rights even ifreceipt of such benefits is in all other
respects a 'mere privilege'."40 The doctrine appears full-blown originally in a
1926 Supreme Court opinion by Justice Sutherland, Frost & Frost Trucking Co.
v. Railroad Commission:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the
federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished

under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the
state threatens otherwise to withhold. . . . It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded4 in the Constitution of the United States may be thus manipulated out of
existence. 1

The doctrine thus holds that government may not exploit its leverage with
citizens or other persons with whom it comes into contact; it may not trade off
waivers for scarce opportunities or goods it happens to control. In a word,
government may not act to buy an estoppel of constitutional rights.
On its face, the doctrine strongly counters the employment waiver
rationale Justice Holmes relied upon in the New Bedford policeman's case in
40.

Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 681 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988) (emphasis

added).
41. 271 US 583, 593-94 (1926). The phrase appears in a number of earlier cases, including
Doyle v Continental Ins. Co., 94 US 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley dissenting) ("[Tihough a State may have
the power... of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction,
it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so.").
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which Holmes suggested the policeman could take the job on the terms
offered or turn it down, but not have it both ways. 4 2 Sutherland's position
puts an end to that view, basically once and for all. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions simply cuts through the policeman's agreement.
It relieves him of all inappropriate terms. It does so by superintending the
bargain directly; it voids any and all unconstitutional terms of the
government's deal. One cannot be discharged for failing to honor a condition
that should not have been presented in the first place. The doctrine frees the
individual to test the substantive validity of the terms themselves; it puts the
government to the test of justification and disallows the defense of contract
per se.
The Frost case was more of a piece with Lochner than with academic
freedom or first amendment rights: it dealt purely with business interests and
an effort by a state to impose conditions of public service in exchange for a
valuable advantage the state threatened otherwise to withhold (the use of
state highways and roads). 4 3 But Frost has had a modern career more
significantly associated with the first amendment, and its rationale bears
directly on public teachers and state university personnel. Thus, although not
itself an academic freedom case, Frost assuredly supplies an important link in
this unhurried review.
An excellent example of the application of Frost, though not one involving
academic freedom in any strict professional usage, is provided by Pickering v.
Board of Education, a unanimous 1968 Supreme Court decision. 44 The contrast
Pickering provides with New Bedford and Scopes 4 5 is instructive of the change
that dates from the Frost case, decided in 1926.
The case was brought by Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher in Will
County, Illinois. In 1964, he had sent a signed personal letter to a local
newspaper. The letter was highly critical of the way the Board of Education
and the district superintendent of schools had handled proposals to raise new
revenue for the schools. The Board then reviewed Pickering's continuing
suitability in light of his letter, in a due process hearing, and concluded that
his publication of the letter was " 'detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district.' " It directed that he be
dismissed. 46 The case was thus similar to the New Bedford case. The outcome
in the Supreme Court was not.
The Supreme Court rejected the New Bedford rationale. Insofar as the state
supreme court's affirmance of Pickering's dismissal seemed partly to turn on
the notion that Pickering's teaching position could be circumscribed by the
42. See note 11 and accompanying text.
43. Frost, 271 US at 589; see also notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
44. Pickering v Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist., 391 US 563 (1968). See also Perry v
Sinderman, 408 US 593 (1972); Givhan v Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 US 410 (1979); Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. Board of Educ. v Doyle, 429 US 274 (1977); Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378
(1987). But see Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983).
45. See notes 11, 14 and accompanying text.
46. Pickering, 391 US at 564-65.
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requirement that he refrain from adverse public comment on the local public
school administration, the Supreme Court simply demurred:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights

they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on

that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this
a premise
4 7
Court.

The Court thus enabled Marvin Pickering to object that such a compelled
agreement was void as an "unconstitutional condition." The case fits neatly
within the analysis we have previously derived from Justice Sutherland's
opinion in Frost.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, helpful as it is
and significant as it has been, has also been misunderstood even in
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. The confusions that have grown
up around it result partly, though not entirely, from the wishful belief that it
solves more problems than it does. Its limitation is simply a variation on the
maxim that water rises no higher than its original source. Concretely, the
doctrine does not instruct one in understanding whether a specific condition
is unconstitutional; rather, it requires the government to show adequate
justification for what it presumes to do, and to make that showing "on the
merits." In brief, the doctrine declares that any answer of the sort that the
petitioner (whoever the petitioner is) agreed to or at least had notice of the
restriction, is never sufficient to carry the government's case. The
government must defend the constitutionality of the condition on its merits,
and not on the ground that it bought the right to impose the restriction.
To restate the doctrine slightly differently, it means that government
cannot exempt itself from the constitutional restraints that otherwise apply to
its actions merely because, were one to treat the same matter as one of private
party contractual agreement, a private party would be relieved of any further
obligation to continue to furnish work or pay if the other party willfully failed
to observe the conditions openly attached in advance. The main point of the
doctrine is that government is never a private party. Its arrangements,
whatever they are, are always circumscribed by restrictions in the
Constitution. These restrictions apply irrespective of the form in which the
government acts, whether it acts as an employer, or as a seller or buyer of
goods. They apply when it acts as administering agency of a public university,
or as a provider of state or federal funds. They apply when it determines who
can teach and who cannot.
In part, moreover, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is also a
variant of two other closely related doctrines in American constitutional law
regarding unconstitutional purpose in the actions of government. The point
often appears in the form of a judicial statement that "what government is
forbidden to do directly, it is equally forbidden to do by indirection."
47.

Id at 568.
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Sometimes it is put in terms of "the purpose and (intended) effect" of the
government's act. And sometimes it is put, even as Sutherland suggested in
Frost, that the government has acted to do one thing "under the guise" of
doing something else. 4 8 In the end, it comes to the same point.
Specifically, the word "guise" in the Sutherland quotation does suggest
that the government is in fact acting by indirection (by some manipulative
means-to adopt contract terms, waivers, contractual submission and the like)
in order to achieve an end it is not entitled to seek. The very idea is thus one
of overreaching for a degree of control over others the government is not
otherwise permitted to assert consistent with the first amendment, but which
overreaching, incorrigibly, it continues to pursue.
But this valuable point to the doctrine is also subject to its own
misunderstanding if one inflates it to mean that whenever the government
acts, it is always deemed to act solely for some ulterior end and never from
any bona fide concern linked to the position one holds that might be sufficient
to sustain the conditions attached. Such a conclusive presumption of
improper purpose cannot be and in fact is not maintained in the courts. To
the contrary, if the government can show a bona fide concern fairly linked to
the position and the condition in question, the condition may not be a guise
for anything else and may not be unconstitutional at all. Rather, if shown to
be warranted by the circumstances, the condition will be sustained. Such a
condition is not an unconstitutional condition. If it needs a name, moreover,
49
there is an obvious one: call it a constitutional condition, instead.
Under these circumstances, whatever the conditions are (and, to be sure
we have not as yet said what they may be in any particular case), it will
necessarily follow that one must comply with the condition or be prepared to
go elsewhere. Moreover, that such conditions may have been nonnegotiable
from the outset may itself make no difference at all. Obviously the
government is not required to trade what it need not yield; so its
48. 271 US at 593.
49. Consider the following example. Suppose that the Supreme Court holds that mere
membership in the Communist Party or the American Nazi Party (or any other party) cannot be
outlawed. Suppose a state legislature, unimpressed by the Court's view that one's choice of political
affiliation is protected by the first amendment, and determined to make such affiliation as difficult as
it possibly can, adopts an act making ineligible for any employment by the state-including as a state
university or public school teacher-any person holding membership in the proscribed parties. The
statute fits Sutherland's description of a guise in the Frost case and should be held invalid. According
to our stipulation of its purpose, the legislature seeks the destruction of political parties it considers a
social menace. Forbidden to act directly, it has proceeded toward the same end indirectly, by
withholding "a valuable privilege" from anyone not "surrendering" his or her constitutional right.
The statute is invalid under the Frost doctrine.
Suppose, however, one stipulates a different objective, namely, a concern solely for national
security in respect to highly classified secrets. And suppose one substitutes a statute narrowly drawn
to that end. It is not obvious that a restriction on some such kinds of access determined in part by
one's political affiliations would necessarily be held unconstitutional. Of course it is possible that this
statute, too, is but a guise, that is, that the claim of national security concern is a legislative fraud.
Nevertheless, absent very strong evidence to that effect, it is not likely to be presumed so and, if not
presumed so, such an act, narrowly drawn, may be constitutional despite its marginal effect in
discouraging certain political affiliations that are otherwise a matter of first amendment "right."
Compare United States v Robel, 389 US 258 (1967); Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952).
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unwillingness to bargain over such matters (whatever they are) is neither here
nor there. The matter is, indeed, at an end.
In substance, then, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions helps
police government actions without necessarily dictating how any particular
case will come out. It does so, first, by enabling the petitioner to attack the
condition, rather than being treated as having waived any objection to it; and
second, by then putting the government to a suitable burden of having to
prove a bona fide-constitutional-objective sufficient to sustain the
condition as applied to the petitioner in the manner the government
proposes, or otherwise give it up. But while these are crucial benefits of the
doctrine (otherwise, government could simply buy up every constitutional
right by estoppel), they are ultimately inconclusive in deciding real cases. The
government may be able to carry its burden ofjustification for the condition.
The question returns us to the first amendment. What justifications are
sufficient to sustain restrictions on one's speech against first amendment
objections, in one's relations with government? What is the basic first
amendment test? What must government show? And how does that
requirement of a showing finally bear on academic freedom?
2. From "Bad Tendency" to New York Times v. Sullivan via the Dissenting
Opinions of Holmes and Brandeis. The Emergence of "The Central Meaning" of Free
Speech. Mr. Justice Holmes, who served on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for twenty years and then served on the United States Supreme
Court for thirty more, has been brought into this essay at every turn of the
discussion. Always, until now, however, he appears as judicial bte noir,
always he votes against each constitutional claim, personifying in each
instance the most skeptical, narrow view of constitutional rights. In each case
we have looked at thus far-Frost and Berea College as well as Patterson, New
Bedford, Lochner, and Meyer-Holmes voted to sustain the state's regulation
against every constitutional claim. And, quite obviously, he seems never to
have championed first amendment rights.
How can it be, then, that Holmes nonetheless came to be canonized as one
of the greatest Justices ever to have served on the Supreme Court? Partly,
indeed perhaps largely, because his view of the first amendment-and of the
central meaning of freedom of speech-fundamentally and finally changed. 50
Holmes was almost certainly the most philosophically inclined judge ever to
occupy a seat on the Supreme Court. And, after two decades on the Court, he
began to write altogether different kinds of epigrams than the sort he had
authored in 1892; new epigrams very much like these: "The United States
may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of
the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
50. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U Chi L Rev 1205,
1303-20 (1983); David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr.justice Holmes, I I Hofstra L Rev
97 (1982).
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How different this sounds from the earlier, dismissive talk of

"privileges" that government may subject to such conditions it sees fit to
impose. Just so, here is another paragraph from a similar Holmes dissent
written near the end of the same decade, in 1928: "[I]f there is any principle
of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other
it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with
us but freedom for the thought that we hate."' 52 There is obviously a stronger
commitment to free speech in this passage than in Holmes' earlier, somewhat

disdainful, remarks.
Here is Holmes again in his most famous dissent in 1919, in Abrams v.
United States:
[Tihe best test of truth is the power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment ....
While that experiment is part of our
system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. I wholly disagree
with the argument ... that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious
53
libel in force.

And here is Holmes dissenting (still again with Brandeis) in 1925: "If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."

54

One

even reasonably attentive to Holmes will see something new in passages such
as these. In significant ways they will eventually lend strong support to
academic freedom as well. But, more generally, Holmes suggests that any
idea (including one that would reorganize the government as a proletarian
dictatorship and terminate the Constitution itself) is as fully protected as any
other. The first amendment itself does not take sides.
Holmes now philosophically resigns himself to the obvious in a larger
sense: life must settle for proxies of truth. Indeed, life can only provide
proxies as truth, each in turn being perpetually subject to displacement by
other ideas that become more compelling proxies of truth, each proxy simply
being whatever seems most correct to each of us, tested in comparison with
alternatives equally unrestricted in their availability to us-an availability it is
one function of freedom of speech to assure. The notion of bad tendency as a
justification to restrict the availability of an idea threatening the status of
51.

Milwaukee Publishing Co. v Burleson, 255 US 407, 437 (1920) (Holmes dissenting). Compare

Lamont v Postmaster General, 381 US 301 (1965). (Lamont is an important case that takes Holmes'
suggestion seriously; it holds that an Act of Congress burdening certain political mail violates the
first amendment, despite the plenary power vested in Congress. Incidentally, Lamont is worthy of
special remembrance; it is the first case ever to strike down an Act of Congress on first amendment
grounds. Id at 305.)
52. United States v Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 654-55 (1928) (Holmes dissenting).
53. 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). Surely Holmes' position has moved from his
1908 view that the first amendment did little more than enact the common law whole.
54. Gitlow, 468 US at 673 (Holmes dissenting).
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institutions, groups, established wisdom, or values through speech cannot
survive this view of the first amendment. The status quo must always defend
itself. The notion of bad tendency as a justification to restrict the availability
of an idea is gone.
Within this central vision of the first amendment, the bad tendency test
gives way under the Holmes rationale. The matter is further explained
sharply in a later dissenting opinion by Justice Rutledge in 1944:
It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize

existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an
effort to legalize polygamy[, for example,] it is obviously necessary to convince a
substantial number of people that such conduct is desirable. But conviction that the
practice is desirable has a natural tendency to induce the practice itself. Thus,
depending upon where the circular reasoning is started, the advocacy of polygamy

may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of law, or be constitutionally
protected
55
as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process.

The net of it is, then, that the natural tendency of one's freedom to present
what is currently thought hateful and wrong as actually quite desirable and
right, to induce breaches of law by those to whom the appeal is
communicated-some of whom may then break the law as it is-is not enough
to enable the state to chill or to punish the person making the case. Under
this very strong view, even predictable increases in violations of existing laws,
traceable to the efficacy of the criticism of the law, cannot be expensed to the
critic of the existing law or of the prevailing social ethic, even though the
lawbreakers themselves may still be punished. It is a social cost of free speech
in a democratic state.
In so suggesting, moreover, Justice Rutledge was but elaborating usefully
on an abrupt point made eighteen years earlier, in Whitney v. California, by
Brandeis (who joined Holmes in the various dissents quoted above): "The
fact [alone] that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression." 56 This, indeed, is very
strong stuff. It is also, however, the meaning of free speech in the United
States. From this point and this principle, all modern doctrines descend. It
is, moreover, not necessary to review a lengthy series of subsequent cases to
illustrate the principle. One case most especially, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 5 7 decided by the Court in 1964, shows in a single decision how
greatly results have changed.
Sullivan was an ordinary civil libel proceeding brought in the Alabama state
courts. False statements referable to Mr. Sullivan as a city commissioner in
Montgomery, Alabama, had appeared in a political advertisement published
by the New York Times (the advertisement solicited funds for a political cause).
The text of the advertisement contained factual exaggerations about
Sullivan's actions as city commissioner and about the extent of his
participation in certain civil rights confrontations in Montgomery. The
55.
56.
57.

,Alusser v Utah, 333 US 95, 101-02 (1948) (Rutledge dissenting) (citations.omitted).
274 US 357, 378 (1926) (Brandeis concurring).
376 US 254 (1964).
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statements were deemed defamatory per se under the Alabama common law
of libel, consistent with the state judge's instructions, and the jury awarded
$500,000 in general damages in favor of Sullivan and against the Times.
Sullivan might have been reversed under the Supreme Court's thenexisting first amendment doctrine. 58 But the Supreme Court by-passed
alternative grounds for reversing the judgment and proceeded to rewrite libel
law in the United States. Directing its attention to the centrality of free speech
and political issues in the United States, the Supreme Court held that, up to a
certain point, evenfalse press reports that may damage the public standing of
a public official may be immune from civil or criminal redress. Indeed, the
Court went on to hold, neither factual falsehood, nor actual harm (loss of job,
shunning by the community), nor even lack of reasonable care in ascertaining
the actual facts prior to publication, nor all in combination will necessarily be
sufficient for a successful libel action. The first amendment, the Court held,
not only disallows criminal prosecution of the publisher, 59 but also bars a law
providing for personal, civil redress. To overcome that bar, according to the
Court's opinion in Sullivan, the plaintiff must meet a new (first amendment)
standard of scienter. Specifically, as determined in a later case, St. Amant v.
Thompson, the plaintiff must establish by evidence of convincing clarity that the
defendant actually, knew the factual statements were false and published them
despite that knowledge or, at a minimum, published them as true even though
the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the[ir] truth ... "60
Negligent failure to check for falsehood is not enough. Sullivan grants a first
amendment immunity to standards journalists themselves would regard as
professional malpractice. In this respect most especially, it is a remarkable
case. Moreover, the first amendment rule Sullivan announced has since been
extended to other figures who attract political interest and its implicit risks of
61
parody and of withering, sometimes cruel, ridicule, as well as of defamation.
Sullivan has cut a wide first amendment swath through the law of torts,
particularly libel and defamation.
58. There were several grounds on which the Supreme Court might have reversed without
announcing the rule it did. Specifically, for example, the amount awarded by the jury bore no
relationship to any evidence of actual damage to Sullivan's public standing in Montgomery, nor was
there evidence of mental anguish or community shunning (no such specific evidence was required in
cases alleging libel per se). Moreover, Sullivan was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, nor
did the Times itself do anything other than publish the advertisement, that is, it had no direct hand in
the advertisement's original preparation, nor did it represent anything on its own behalf as a source
of news. Any award beyond purely nominal damages under these circumstances might well have
been regarded as foreclosed by the first amendment. No broader issue need have been reached.
59. The first amendment assuredly does apply to bar such prosecutions. See, for example,
Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964).
60. St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 731 (1968) (decided subsequent to Sullivan and adding to
its reasoning).
61. For its most recent extension and application, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell, 485 US 46,
56 (1988) (political advertisement parody depicting televangelist fictitiously as a drunken and
incestuous hypocrite, held absolutely protected by first amendment regardless of emotional distress
publisher may have meant to cause and was determined in fact to have caused). Hustler holds that the
first amendment protects a right of political ridicule virtually absolutely. Hustler is also a highly
important terminal case in a very long historical line; it ends the last possible vestige of any valid law
of seditious libel in the United States.
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Underneath, however, Sullivan is of a first amendment piece with the
Holmes-Brandeis-Rutledge quotations we have abstracted from cases going
back to the 1920s. The overall lesson is that neither the bad tendency, nor the
"clear and present danger," nor yet the actual fact of some proximately
resulting harms-even harms foreseeable to the author, the parodist, or the
speaker as of the moment he or she looses her words on paper or sends them
out into some public or private audience-will necessarily bring the utterer
athwart of the law. Whether it will do so depends on what one sees to be the
resulting cost to free speech. In Musser, Justice Rutledge's insightful dissent
explored this concept of cost in a general way through the compelling
example of speech advocating polygamy. 62 In Sullivan, the Court likewise
pursued the concept of costs to free speech and developed still an additional
step: "That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need ... to survive' [seems obvious]."

63

Thus, in the Court's view,

even factual misstatements, including some that may be quite damaging to
public officials or to other public figures, nonetheless receive a qualified first
amendment immunity. Without extending our case law examples much
further, perhaps we can now see where these first amendment trends will lead.
In the 1950s, Judge Learned Hand proposed a first amendment formula
that tried to catch some of the developments we have rather casually
reviewed. His formulation is useful as a general statement, and far removed
from the original, bad tendency test. Even so, it needs careful reading; it is
often misunderstood. Here is the general formulation Hand suggested: "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."64

Judge Hand's formulation is usually read as though it were a simple tort
law formula for judges to apply. It is taken to say that if (but only if) one has
fairly discounted the gravity of the evil to be avoided by the improbability of
its likely happening as a result of someone's speech, so as not to exaggerate
the need for the restraint on speech and so as not needlessly to interfere with
speech, one may then invade free speech, albeit only to the extent necessary
65
to avoid the danger.
62. See note 55 and accompanying text.
63. 376 US at 271-72 (citations omitted). Critics of Sullivan (and there are many) do not
disagree with the basic statement. Rather, the quarrel is whether the scienter standard exceeds any
proper first amendment need, that is, that at least with respect to commercial publishers including
newspapers, liability for negligent failure to check for falsity would be the appropriate line for the
first amendment to draw where the plaintiff carries his or her burden under every other standard
provided in Sullivan itself.
64. Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 510 (1951), citing opinion of Judge Learned Hand in
United States v Dennis, 183 F2d 201, 212 (2d Cir 1950).
65. Alternatively, implicit in the formula is the suggestion that where for some reason the
measures taken to avoid the evil fail, but if the test is otherwise satisfied, the law may provide
appropriate redress for the actual harm that ensued.
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However, this reading goes too fast and takes too much for granted. One
must read Judge Hand's statement more carefully. Judge Hand was framing a
larger, harder question, and he did not say what the answer would necessarily
be: courts must additionally ask whether X danger of Y evil justifies such
invasion of free speech as may, admittedly, be necessary to avoid the danger;
there is no implicit assumption that it necessarily will.
Moreover, from what we have reviewed thus far, it should now be apparent
that the answer to Judge Hand's unanswered question turns out to be quite
complicated under first amendment doctrine today. The short answer is that
sometimes it will, but sometimes it won't, as the Court's holding in the
Sullivan case illustrates, as Rutledge's example in Musser implies, and as the
Brandeis quotation in Whitney declares. The answer is it won't, if the invasion
leaves freedom of speech "too little space in which to breathe"-too little
space to enable people to speak passionately for their beliefs or to seek
through their speech to transfigure society, regardless of the direction they
would try to take it by the political effects of their ideas and their appeals. In
the hard law of the first amendment, the central meaning of first amendment
in the United States today is found in the far greater substantiality of this
constitutionally sheltered "breathing space" than was once provided. In the
decades since 1907-1908 and Patterson,6 6 constitutional doctrine has moved
very far (farther than most Americans themselves understand) from the bad
tendency test.
E
As an interlude to our discussion thus far, now that we have a more
current and different grasp of freedom of speech under the first and
fourteenth amendments, 6 7 we can easily see how freedom of speech fits some
fairly standard cases of the sort we already touched upon. We are now in a
much better position than we were a few pages ago to examine how such cases
might come out on the merits when reviewed in the Supreme Court since
these changes occurred.
An excellent case for such an examination is Pickering v. Board of
Education,68 our earlier case involving Marvin Pickering, the letter-writing high
school teacher, which was decided in the Supreme Court just four years after
New York Times v. Sullivan. Pickering's difficulties, one will recall, arose from
the critical letter he wrote to a local newspaper, commenting on recent school
bond measures that had failed despite strong and well-publicized school
board endorsement and support.
Pickering's letter identified him as a local teacher, although he declared in
the letter-albeit complainingly-that he was writing only "as a citizen,
taxpayer and voter, and not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken
66.
67.
respect
68.

See note 10 and accompanying text.
Bearing in mind that, since 1925 the first and 14th amendments have been treated alike in
to free speech.
391 US 563; see note 44 and accompanying text.
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away from the teachers by the administration." 69 His letter harshly criticized
the board's public representations made to encourage voter support for the
bond issues; it suggested that some of them were untrue or at least
misleading. His letter also argued that some past uses of funds were not in
keeping with their original representation, for example, that more had been
spent for athletics than for education, contrary to what had been said by the
board. Overall, moreover, his letter laid a large portion of blame for the
failure of the bond issues on the board and the school administration itself.
Some specific statements in his letter (for example, on the cost of school
cafeteria lunches) were false, although there was no suggestion that Pickering
either knew or thought them to be inaccurate.
Previously, we limited our review of Pickering to a single, preliminary point,
namely, a New Bedford-type claim made by the board in the state court that so
long as Pickering continued to work as a public employee with notice that he
did so under the constraint of forbearing from criticizing the schools, he
could not complain of being terminated once he was shown in a fair hearing
to have dishonored that condition. Under this view, recall, it was up to
Pickering to determine the acceptability of the tradeoff; he could quit
whenever he found it unacceptable, but he could not ignore it and expect to
be kept on. We already noted the Court's rejection of that proposition under
the Frost rationale. But we also noted something else: that the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is often inconclusive of real cases; it begs the
question of whether some conditions are not necessarily unconstitutional at
all. Thus, a concrete example-regarding access to classified informationwas furnished in a passing footnote to make the point plain. 70 Noting this
inconclusiveness, we returned to the main track of first amendment doctrine.
We return, re-examining Pickering, to see the final result reached under
substantive first amendment law.
Pickering's letter identified him as a teacher. Moreover, he wrote about
matters affecting the public schools about which readers might assume he was
particularly well informed. In places, his letter was factually inaccurate. It was
also sarcastic, insinuating, and rude. It was not addressed quietly or internally
to make helpful or constructive suggestions to the elected members of the
board. Rather, it was released into the local newspaper for its general
ventilative effect. To be sure, there was no evidence of its community impact.
69. Pickering, 391 US at 578. Pickering's complete letter appears in the Appendix of the case, id
at 575. As to his latter statement, the Supreme Court concluded that he had some factual basis for it
to the extent that the Teachers Handbook required prior submission to a school principal and
triplicate copies to a publicity coordinator in advance. Since the letter elsewhere indicated that this
was the basis for Pickering's claim (that "freedom has been taken from the teachers by the
administration"), the Court held that readers were merely invited to judge for themselves, that is to
say, that the statement was clearly offered as Pickering's opinion, rather than as a revelation of false
facts. Id at 570-71.
70. See note 49 (Access to highly classified information may be denied on considerations of
national security, and even one's political affiliations that cannot be forbidden may nonetheless be
taken into account in granting or withholding such access in certain circumstances, depending upon
the degree of perceived serious risk.).
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Nonetheless, were there no suitable grounds for the board to expect
something better of a teacher in Marvin Pickering's position? In Pickering, the
Court first held-as we might expect-that a rule forbidding any teacher or
other school employee to comment publicly on any matter affecting the local
schools without administrative permission would be an unconstitutional prior
restraint under the first amendment. Assisted now by Sullivan and our review
in the preceding section, we can now go much further, however, and see how
the result for Pickering was substantially more favorable than when weaker
views of the first amendment prevailed.

Specifically, here is how matters

went.
The opening emphasis of the opinion is on the public subject matter of
Pickering's letter: school taxes, referendum bond measures, and popular

71
voting at scheduled elections, the stuff of the democratic process itself.

Such public political speech, the Court insists, is highly protected overall; one
cannot, as a condition of being a teacher, be forbidden to address such public
issues publicly on the claim that school interests would be better served by a
nonpartisan silence. Moreover, the critical, rather than neutral or supportive,
tone of Pickering's views is "unequivocally reject[ed]" as providing grounds
for his dismissal; 72 the first amendment does not allow the school board to
require that he speak only favorably or neutrally, whether of itself or the
alleged need for school bonds, as a condition of speaking at all.
Next, that Pickering was not merely critical in what he wrote but was also
unpleasantly insinuating toward the board was treated by the Court as
insufficient grounds to fire him for his public or professional incivility. "In
these circumstances," Justice Marshall said, "we conclude that the interest of
the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to
public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar
contribution by any member of the general public." 7 3 Thus the board could
not seize upon Pickering out of frustration that, in their view, his letter did not
represent them fairly or treat them courteously, though their feeling might
itself be an understandable and even warranted reaction in light of the letter's
tone. The board's interest in requiring general fairness, or even civility, was
71. Pickering, 391 US at 564-68. In contrast, a subsequent case, Connick v Myers, 461 US 138
(1983), draws a bright-line distinction that puts public employees at risk for voicing internal workrelated grievances principally related to their own status. Under Connick, the employee may be fired,
without recourse at all under the first amendment, by those of whom or to whom they complain. The
Court's desire to seek some de minimis limit on "mere internal complaint" cases (as it is inclined to
call them) is understandable, but the line drawn by Connick is not. The difficulty with Connick is that
its first amendment line is arbitrary and indifferent to any particularized facts as well as to the severity
of the restriction at risk (dismissal). Connick's lesson is that public employees who may have a just
complaint may be fired with impunity by the very person already abusing them simply for speaking
about the matter, even assuming their complaint is entirely true. Indeed, they may be fired because it
is true. In respect to academic personnel, moreover, since it is obvious that both general and specific
"workplace conditions" are constitutive elements of getting work done in a literal sense, academic
freedom itself implies the protection of some prerogative to speak about such matters. See, for
example, Matthew W. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 Tex L Rev
1323, 1335-45 (1988).
72. Pickering, 391 US at 570.
73. Id at 573.
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too insubstantial under the circumstances (that is, as the court noted, "not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public").7 4 The connection between the letter and
Pickering's possible professionalism or lack thereof as a teacher (how he
conducted himself in the classroom) was wholly speculative. The Court
75
likewise noted that Pickering did not personally work for the board itself.
Finally, the Supreme Court protected Pickering despite his factual
mistakes, pursuant to the Sullivan rationale. As in Sullivan, the Court noted
some margin of error is inevitable in such matters. The Court held that to cite
Pickering's mistakes as creating the risk of dismissal when venturing into
local, public, political debate would provide too little breathing space under
the first amendment. The board could seek correction of the factual mistakes
by recourse to the newspaper columns Pickering used. It could not, however,
dismiss Pickering. In short, Pickering's free speech claim prevailed.
Pickering is thus an excellent illustration of how things have changed since
1908, and of how much stronger the first amendment has become in a general
way. It is now but a very short step to fit academic freedom within the first
amendment. We turn at once to see how it was done.
F
Academic freedom made its first express Supreme Court appearance in a
dissent by Justice William Douglas, a former academic, in a 1952 case, Adler v.
Board of Education.76 With Justice Black concurring in his dissent, Douglas
invoked "academic freedom" three times, in a specific, first amendment
usage. He also gave the phrase a distinguishing identity for general legal use.
At issue in Adler was a New York statute providing for the disqualification
and removal from public employment of any person espousing the use of
violence to alter the form of government in the United States. The act (the
Feinberg Law 7 7 ) also provided that membership in any listed subversive
group would constitute prima facie evidence that the person possessed the
disabling trait. It further provided for disclaimer oaths and other detailed
inquiries, as well as investigative hearings.
The majority of the Court sustained the statute from facial attack. In the
main, it relied on the still-lingering right-privilege distinction, harkening all
the way back to 1892; for that reason, the majority position was not to last.
Fifteen years later, the right-privilege rationale no longer sufficed as a prop in
the Supreme Court, and Adler was substantially overruled. 78 Our interest is,
correspondingly, limited to the Douglas dissent.
74. Id.
75. So the result might have been different had Pickering been an employee of the Board. Later
cases press this point rather hard.
76. Adler v Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 342 US 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas dissenting).
77. 1949 Laws of State of New York ch 360.
78. See Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 605-06 (1967), discussed at notes 107-08 and
accompanying text. ("[Clonstitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its
major premise. That premise was that public employment, including academic employment, may be
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Justice Douglas voted to hold the Feinberg law unconstitutional. His
overall approach was of a piece with Meyer and Bartels, two cases we have
previously reviewed. 79 In Adler, however, Douglas expressly drew on the first
amendment to shelter academic freedom. In Meyer, as we noted, the
protection of academic freedom was merely an incident of substantive due
process review. The analytic similarities of the cases-the majority opinion in
Meyer and the Douglas dissent in Adler-are nonetheless striking.
In Meyer, the Court found fault, not with the stated object sought by
legislature (to assure English literacy in youngsters regardless of the school in
which they were enrolled), but with the means. Similarly, Justice Douglas did
not find fault with the stated object of the Feinberg Law. 80 Rather, he argued,
the fault also lay with the means. In Meyer, the objection was that the device
used by the legislature to achieve a proper end was unconstitutionally
excessive. A similar objection, in Douglas's view, was equally applicable in
Adler.
Douglas wrote that if the state did not mean to "raise havoc with academic
freedom," ' it must confine itself to limiting certain specific acts endangering
public safety or putting public education at unfair risk. But the Feinberg Law,
he insisted, was not so confined and was, rather, prejudicially restrictive in
respect to those it disabled from teaching and excessive in how it would
necessarily affect others as well. Declaring that "[t]here can be no real
academic freedom in [the] environment" of exclusion and of teacher fear
generated by the Feinberg Law, 82 Douglas found fault with it in two
intertwined respects. The first was that the per se employment
disqualification of persons from academic appointment in any public school
based on what they might espouse as individuals was inconsistent with one of
the concerns of academic freedom because it eliminated a nonrandom,
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct
governmental action. . . . [T]hat theory was expressly reected in a series of decisions following Adler."
(citations omitted and emphasis added)).
79. Meyer, 262 US 390; Bartels, 262 US 404; see notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
80. The "stated object" is deliberately emphasized because, given the broad manner in which the
statutes in Meyer and Adler were drawn, the question of what the legislature in each case actually
meant to do is unclear. In Meyer, as discussed in note 30, there was reason to believe the legislature
may have been acting only partly in good faith, that is to say, to improve English literacy but also to
suppress the German language. The statute was efficiently drawn to do both. In Adler, there is the
same double effect (improve national security but also suppress Communists) and possibly some of
the same mixed legislative motives as well (in Adler, as in Meyer, the statute seems drawn to do both).
So the problem in each case, commonplace in civil liberties litigation, is in large part this problem of
double effects and the corresponding problem of how best for the judiciary to confine legislatures to
legislate appropriately, limiting their legislation only to constitutionally permissible ends. The
majority in Meyer and Douglas in Adler confronted this problem directly. But neither Holmes in Meyer
nor the majority in Adler did. The general judicial approach since Adler is to subject statutes affecting
first amendment rights to strict scrutiny, with no favoring assumption to the legislature that the
breadth of the statute was required by the circumstances; rather, the necessity for such breadth must
itself be shown to the satisfaction of the court. (For an oft-cited reference on the general role of
judicial review and heightened scrutiny in first amendment cases, see United States v Carolene Products
Co., 304 US 144, 152 n4 (1938)).
81. Adler, 342 US at 509 (emphasis added).
82. Id at 510 (emphasis added).
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ideologically specific cohort from further consideration as teachers in any
public school. 8 3 So sweeping an exclusion, in Douglas's view, raised a serious
academic freedom, first amendment concern. 84 Additionally, the statute also
operated as a source of intimidation to other teachers. "[The] system of
spying and surveillance [provided for by the statute] with its accompanying
reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom," Douglas
argued, taking into account the full apparatus of the Feinberg Law. 8 5 "It
produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth." 8 6 The problem of
the Feinberg Law in this view was that it bore down threateningly on all
teachers in the New York system. It would, in Douglas's view, compel
teachers within the system to steer a wide course to keep from triggering the
trip wires of the New York law. It was far different than a statute directed to
acts of professional misconduct. Its chilling effect, lest one draw attention to
oneself (for example, by the nature of the subject, the materials one might
assign, or how one might propose to examine the subject in class), was
obvious and substantial, in Douglas's view. 8 7 A more narrowly crafted law was
required to avoid the costs to academic freedom.
The Douglas dissent in Adler is notable beyond the fact that the phrase
"academic freedom" appears for the first time in direct first amendment
usage. Douglas also employed academic freedom as a distinct, identified
subset of constitutional first amendment concern. He does not dismiss it as
merely parasitic on a standard free speech claim. Within the framework
Douglas provides, moreover, there remain almost no problems left to give it
recognizable shape within standard first amendment law.
G
Later in the same term, Justice Felix Frankfurter (like Douglas, also a
former academic) provided a concurring opinion that nearly completes the
identification of academic freedom protection as a subset of first amendment
83. Id at 508-09.
84. The concern is that the exclusion self-selects all of a certain incidental political disposition
just as, say, a Soviet exclusion of all individuals holding pro-capitalist attitudes from teaching
eligibility would do, within their system, in an opposite way. This is an academic wrong, moreover, in
that it is not merely an alternative way of framing a standard, personal free speech claim.
85. Adler, 342 US at 510-11 (emphasis added).
86. Id at 511.
87. This may, incidentally, be a suitable place to note the connection of the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (emphasis added) with Justice Douglas's position in
Adler. Teachers perpetually subject to nonrenewal, by mere notice that their services are no longer
required by the institution, may be kept on their toes by the uncertainty of reappointment from year
to year. But the lack of tenure also undercuts academic freedom in a serious way; as did the law in
Adler, albeit in a different fashion, the system presses teachers to steer away from any possible trip
wire that might put them out on the street. Thus, the AAUP regards tenure, following a
probationary period (up to seven years), with dismissal thereafter for cause as determined in some
kind of pretermination academic due process hearing, a vital safeguard to academic freedom itself.
(The alternative, in a manner of speaking, is a system that keeps those who teach on their knees.) See
William R. Keast, Faculty Tenure (Jossey-Bass, 1973); Fritz Machlup, In Defense of Academic Tenure, 50
AAUP Bull 112 (1964); William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense, " 57
AAUP Bull 328 (1971); Ralph S. Brown &Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53
L & Contemporary Problems 325 (Summer 1990).
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law. In Wieman v. Updegraff,8 8 the Supreme Court reviewed a state statute
requiring compliance with a broad disclaimer oath as a condition of public
employment.8 9 Frankfurter concurred in the decision holding the statute
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment, but he wrote separately to
say why the statute was invalid as applied to teachers in particular, apart from
its unconstitutional effect on the associational rights of other public
employees.
The statute applied to all persons seeking or holding public jobs. The
particular case before the Supreme Court, however, had been brought on
appeal by several state college faculty members. Justice Frankfurter held that
the oath requirement was too broad to be sustained as to them in particular.
His opinion, with Douglas concurring, marked out tightened boundaries
limiting state control of public school and university faculty, on a specialized
rationale. Frankfurter's objections in Wieman were based on vintage academic
freedom premises, absorbed into first and fourteenth amendment law.
Closely tracking Douglas's opinion in Adler, Frankfurter used the same
constitutional analysis to the state law at issue that Douglas had applied to the
Feinberg Law. Here, as in Adler, the first objection was to the winnowing
effect of the disclaimer oath on the pool of eligible appointees for public
school or state university teaching. The oath's exclusion was a coarse means
of checking legitimate public interests in determining professional
competence or on-the-job integrity. At the same time, it was bound to have a
parochializing effect downstream, shaping the scope of academic freedom as a
practical matter. Related, but equally substantial, in Frankfurter's view, was
the additional dampening effect of the oath on the remaining (already
narrowed) field of academic personnel. The point is the same as the one
Douglas emphasized in Adler: the intimidating effect of the regulation on all
remaining academic personnel. Both branches of Frankfurter's objection are
quickly noted in the following few words:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But,
in view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of
thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of
those amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free
spirit of teachers affects not only those who, like the appellants, are immediately
before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to chill that
free play of the spirit
90
which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.

Significantly, Frankfurter added an observation that warrants close attention:
"The functions of educational institutions in our national life and the
conditions under which alone they can adequately perform them are at the
88.

344 US 183 (1952).

89. The oath eliminated from any public employment any person affiliated with any listed
subversive organization, whether or not the disqualified person was aware of whatever it was that
made the organization subversive when he or she joined. The "[ilndiscriminate classification of
innocent with knowing activity," the Court held, cut too wide and arbitrary a swath. On that ground
it was held invalid under the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Id at 191.
90. Id at 195 (emphasis added) (Frankfurter concurring).
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basis of these limitations upon State and National power." 9' What are "these"
limitations? Obviously, they are those that he had just addressed: first and
fourteenth amendment limitations on state and national power to narrow the
width of academic eligibility or chill the professionalism of public school or
public university faculty in performing their proper work.
What underlies these limitations? "The functions of educational
institutions .

..

and the conditions under which alone [academic personnel]

can adequately perform them," Frankfurter insisted. 9 2 What functions? "The" functions include critical educational teaching functions, as Frankfurter
understood those functions, of course.
Frankfurter's operating premises all sound very familiar by 1952, the date
of his opinion, in terms of the general case already long since made outside the
Constitution (till now), to explain the imperatives of academic freedom. But
in Wieman, Frankfurter concretely linked that case finally into the hard law of
the first and fourteenth amendments as well. He soundly located in these
amendments a strong set of constitutional restrictions on state and on
national power in establishing and operating public educational institutions.
Frankfurter's position in Wieman was no different with respect to public
educational institutions than the Holmes dictum in the 1920s and Holmes's
discussion of the post office. 9 3 The government may give up the post office
whenever it likes, Holmes had said, but may not presume to run it however it
pleases, because, while the post operates, its use by each of us on fair first
amendment terms is virtually as critical as the free use of our tongues. So,
equally, Frankfurter suggested in Wieman, the government may give up public
education whenever it likes, yet not conduct it other than according to
conditions of academic freedom so long as it stays in the business of education. The
premises of the first amendment require the protection of academic freedom
in the structuring of state universities and public schools.
Five years later, Frankfurter reiterated and filled out these thoughts in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, decided by the Supreme Court in 1957. 9 4 Sweezy

arose out of investigative hearings conducted by the New Hampshire Attorney
General pursuant to state legislative directives under the New Hampshire
Subversive Activities Act. 9 5 It is of a piece with Adler, Wieman, and a dozen
other cases pulling and hauling at the first amendment during the 1950s when
disloyalty investigations, oath requirements, and new employment restrictions
loomed large.
New Hampshire Attorney General Louis Wyman had subpoenaed Paul
Sweezy to answer questions including several inquiring into specific lectures
he had given at the University of New Hampshire. At the hearings, Sweezy
freely described himself as a "classical Marxist" and a socialist; he also
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id at 197 (emphasis added).
Id.
Burleson, 255 US at 437; see notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
354 US 234 (1957).
NH Laws 1951 ch 193; now NH Rev Stat Ann, 1955, ch 588, §§ 1-16.
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testified that he had never advocated the use of violence as a means of altering
any government in the United States. However, Sweezy declined to divulge
what he had discussed in his lectures at the university. He was cited for
contempt and jailed until he would comply.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Sweezy is only of passing
interest, because it ultimately turned on a rather narrow ground. The Court
noted that the questions asked of Sweezy skated very close to first amendment
concerns of free speech and academic freedom (Chief Justice Warren's
observations were strongly supportive of both kinds of first amendment
claim). 9 6 Then, however, the opinion moved away from that discussion to
hold that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the claim that
the legislature wished the Attorney General to pursue its inquiry in the
manner he had pressed against Sweezy. That being the case, the Court held,
Sweezy's refusal to answer was not clearly in contempt of anything the
legislature might have sought, so treating Sweezy as in contempt was a denial
of due process of law. Justice Frankfurter (with Justice Harlan joining him)
concurred in the result, but not in Chief Justice Warren's reasoning.
Frankfurter's position required that the case turn on the substantive academic
freedom first amendment claim Sweezy had advanced. Finding the state
attorney general authorized by the state legislature to have proceeded as he
did, Frankfurter went directly to the sole remaining question: did the first
amendment shield Sweezy's refusal to answer questions probing the contents
of his university lecture? Frankfurter and Harlan held, on first amendment
academic freedom grounds, that it did.
The Frankfurter opinion extended his opinion in Wieman on academic
freedom. In several respects it also anticipated the Sullivan holding about first
amendment imperatives of adequate "breathing space." His point in Sweezy
was not that teachers may never be required to account for their teaching; it
was that the social imperatives of academic freedom operate through the first
amendment to require close judicial superintendence of such inquiries
because of their implicitly chilling effects. Thus, he held, only compelling
need will excuse such an inquiry when it is pursued by political agencies, even
including authorized committees of the state legislature and even when the
university is one the state operates and funds.
The test Frankfurter proposed (and which he held had not been met in this
case) was as follows: "Political power must abstain from intrusion into this
96. Chief Justice Warren's opinion did expressly invoke "academic freedom," and he
distinguished it from general first amendment rights of political expression. "We believe that there
unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academicfreedom and political
expression . ... ' Sweezy, 354 US at 250 (emphasis added). He also declared that "[tihe essentiality
of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident," and that academic
freedom has a student, as well as a faculty, aspect: "Teachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die." Id. Then, declaring that "[w]e do not now conceive of any
circumstance wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields," Warren
nonetheless abruptly broke off the discussion ("[blut we do not need to reach such fundamental
questions of state power to decide this case") and moved to another basis to decide. Id at 251.
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activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the
97
people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling."
The phrase, "except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling,"
isnot the usual standard an inquiring legislative committee need meet under
the first amendment in order to overcome a first amendment-based refusal by
a witness properly subpoenaed to respond to its questions.9" Frankfurter's
standard is significantly more stringent, as he was at pains to acknowledge.
His justification was a continuation of his concurrence in Wieman. It was
directed to the social functions of universities and to the first amendment
corollary of academic freedom that Frankfurter regarded as constraining the
government when academic freedom is at stake:
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into
the intellectual life of a university, such justification [as might ordinarily suffice in
other settings] for compelling a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears
grossly inadequate .... These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the
testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on
free universities. This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the
intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs
avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of
scholars .99

Quoting at the end of his opinion from what, in 1957, he rightly called
"perhaps the most poignant"' 0 0 statement on academic freedom yet to
appear anywhere-a searing Statement of Remonstrance by The Open
Universities in South Africa against their own government's actionsFrankfurter added the following:
A university ceases to be true to its own nature ifit becomes the tool of Church or
State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free
inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-to follow the argument where it leads...
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the
four essential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
10 1
to study.

Returning to the case at hand, Frankfurter acknowledged that the particular
intrusions posed by the limited questions Sweezy had been asked might seem
minor and unthreatening, but insisted they were not. The overall chilling
effect in the circumstances would be major, even if immeasurable. The
justification given for the intrusions was neither exigent nor compelling under
the circumstances. So, he held, considerations of first amendment academic
freedom precluded Sweezy from being held in contempt. With Justice
97.

Id at 262 (emphasis added).

98.

Compare Sweezy with Braden v United States, 365 US 431 (1961) and with Wilkinson v United

States, 365 US 399 (1961) (contempt convictions for refusing to answer legislative investigative
committee questions upheld against first amendment objections, the standard of judicial review as
applied not being as stringent as that required in Sweezy).
99. Sweezy, 354 US at 262.
100. Id.
101. Id at 262, 263, quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12 (a statement ofa conference
of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of Witwatersrand).
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Harlan, he joined in the reversal of Sweezy's contempt conviction specifically
on this ground.
In the dicta of the Chief Justice in Sweezy, and more concretely in the
passages we have reviewed in Sweezy, Wieman, and Adler, distinct principles of
academic freedom were linked directly to the protections of the first and
fourteenth amendments. In academic life, the first amendment had come
around.
III
ELABORATING THE USAGES OF "ACADEMIC FREEDOM" IN THE
SUPREME COURT

A.

(1957-1967)

Within the decade following Sweezy, 1957-1967, a half-dozen decisions in
the Supreme Court worked at the edges of the Adler, Wieman, and Sweezy
doctrines expressly relating first amendment developments and academic
freedom. Five of these cases principally involved public colleges and
universities. The sixth touched public schools as well. The trend of the cases
yielded a strengthened first amendment philosophy within the Court. Four of
the six cases elaborated on academic freedom within the special protection of
10 2
the first amendment. Only the first of these cases, Barenblattv. United States,
briefly faltered from Frankfurter's strongly stated position in Sweezy, although
another also substantially bypassed a generalized academic freedom claim
even while providing relief on an alternative ground. The other four moved
strongly to verify claims of academic freedom marked out in first amendment
metes and bounds.
Barenblatt v. United States, the first of these cases, was decided by a closely
divided Court, five-to-four, in 1959. In Barenblatt,Justice Harlan wrote for a
bare majority in sustaining a federal misdemeanor conviction of a former
University of Michigan teaching fellow who had been prosecuted for
contempt in refusing to answer questions during a public session of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. Several of the questions were
directed to his possible knowledge of alleged Communist Party activities at
educational institutions, including some seeking to determine the extent of
his participation, if any, in Communist Party activities. Unlike Sweezy, none of
the questions pressed him on any particular teaching or studying in which he
may have been engaged, and the issue of academic freedom appears hardly to
have been engaged.
Justice Harlan, finding the committee duly authorized to investigate the
general subject, and finding also that the committee had reason to think the
witness might have information pertinent to the inquiry, sustained the
demand for answers against Barenblatt's first amendment objection. The
102.

360 US 109 (1959).
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majority opinion made no reference to academic freedom except as a footnote
03
mention from an amicus brief filed by the AAUP.1
The dissent by Justice Black also yielded no useful focused discussion of
academic freedom. Rather, the Black dissent launched an excoriating first
amendment attack on the House committee generally. The case was
adjudicated in generalized free speech terms.' 0 4 Barenblatt proved to be quite
uneventful in the long run, either to extend Frankfurter's discussion in Sweezy
or to cut it off.
Four years later, in Yelin v. United States,' 0 5 a similar contempt conviction
of a witness who had declined to respond to questions-some of which bore
on the witness's activities while at the University of Michigan-was overturned
in the Supreme Court. Even so, the new five-to-four majority on the Court,
though it held oppositely from Barenblatt, also deflected any academic
freedom issue even more completely than the Barenblatt Court had done. The
case overall is probably a better example of the Court still struggling to find
its feet. The sole mention of "academic freedom" reported in the case went
largely unaddressed. The case was disposed of in the noncomplying witness's
favor, but on narrow procedural due process grounds.' 0 6
In contrast, in 1967, the New York Feinberg Law (previously upheld in the
Adler case) was struck down on its face on substantive first amendment
grounds in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' 0 7 Moreover, the emphasis was not
only once again centered on the first amendment; but the outcome also
turned specifically on the professional effects of the law, that is, on its effects
on teachers. The state law's requirement of an annual subversive-action
103. Id at 130 n29. The AAUP amicus brief (October Term, 1958, No 35) argued that first
amendment imperatives of academic freedom do not privilege teachers from accounting for their
work, but suggested that the standards endorsed by Justice Frankfurter in the Sweezy case had not
been fulfilled by the Committee, thus, that the contempt sanction ought not be sustained. Justice
Harlan did not appear to dispute the point as established in Sweezy (he had, after all, joined
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy); rather, his opinion implies that the issue was not necessarily
engaged by the facts before the Court.
104. That is, the dissent, like the majority opinion, was occupied with the role of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities overall and its broad threat to lawful dissent and political
affiliation generally, rather than with the particular facts of the Barenblatt case. Justice Black did cite
Sweezy, id at 139- 40, as requiring proof of a compelling need before the committee could brush over
a witness's first amendment interests; and he did conclude that no sufficiently compelling need had
been established by the committee, but it was a secondary reproach at best. For a fresh view of
Barenblatt generally, see Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradition 497-531 (Harper & Row, 1st ed 1988).
105. 374 US 109 (1963).
106. Id at 124. In Yelin, the witness was asked a number of questions in public session
concerning his activities as a student at the University of Michigan and why he had provided no
reference to having been at the University when he later applied for a steel-milljob. In declining to
answer this and several other questions, Yellin read a statement in which he claimed privilege partly
on grounds of academic freedom, id at 140, but the objection is neither elaborated on nor further
addressed by the Court. Rather, the majority of the Court held that Yellin could not be held in
contempt for refusing to answer questions in any public session because a request that he had
submitted to be heard solely in executive session had not been referred to the whole committee for
consideration and voted on as provided by the committee's own rules. In short, the Court held that
such procedural protections of witnesses, such as the Committee Rules, could not be ignored by the
committee, even assuming the rules could be repealed or revoked at will.
107. 385 US 589, 609, 610 (discussed in note 78).
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disclaimer affidavit, the scope of the required affidavit, and the heavy
accompaniment of enforcement machinery laid in place for proceeding
against those accused of taking the oath falsely, were held to be
unconstitutional as applied to state university or public school teachers.
The analysis of the first amendment academic freedom abridgments of the
Feinberg Law was undertaken by Justice Brennan in Keyishian. Overall, the
analysis is of a piece with that of Justice Douglas in Adler, except that now it
represented a majority position in applying the first amendment. Writing for a
new majority, moreover, Justice Brennan placed the protection of academic
freedom within the core of first amendment concerns and not at its margins.
The paragraph in which he did so would be quoted repeatedly by the Court
during the next twenty years:
[A]cademic freedom . . . is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the FirstAmendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection. 10 8

In holding the law invalid as applied to those in public education, Keyishian
marks an important rite of passage. What New York Times v. Sullivan had meant
in respect to journalism in the United States-a landmark first amendment
decision providing professional breathing room for critical journalism-Keyishian
forcefully represents in respect to academic freedom, including the academic
freedom of those holding appointment by the state.
Later in the same term in Whitehill v. Elkins,' 0 9 the Court voided a
Maryland disclaimer oath on similar grounds. The Maryland act required
teachers to swear as a condition of public university appointment that the oath
taker was not engaged "in one way or another" (sic) in acts seeking the
overthrow of the state or national government by force or violence. " 10 False
swearing was made punishable as perjury. The opinion for the Court holding
the requirement void was by Justice Douglas. He concluded that the oath act
(and a section providing for the dismissal of those found on reasonable
grounds to be subversive"') was too broad to be consistent with the first
amendment obligations to secure adequate protection of academic freedom in
public education.
108. Id at 603 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). For examples of the
steering effect of the Feinberg Law the Court found to conflict with academic freedom, see id at 601
("The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a
highly efficient in terrorem mechanism. It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as
possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmieshing him in this intricate
machinery."). The opinion also draws heavily from Frankfurter's concurring opinions in Wieman, 344
US at 194-98, and Sweezy, 354 US at 255-67, in explaining the full first amendment rationale.
109. 389 US 54 (1967).
110. Maryland Subversive Activities Act, Art 85A Md Code Ann §§ 1, 11, 13 (Michie 1969),

repealed by Acts 1978, ch 257.
111. Idat § 14.
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As in Keyishian, Sweezy, Wieman, and Adler, moreover, Douglas's first
amendment analysis focused on the law's impact on teachers and
professors." t2 As an example of the law's objectionable steering effect,
Douglas observed that a faculty member, once having taken the oath, would
need to avoid attending any international conference whose auspices were not
totally known to him, simply from fear of drawing an investigation upon
himself as having violated his oath." 3 After quoting extensively from Sweezy,
Douglas framed the dispositive objection this way:
The continuing surveillance which this type of law places on teachers is hostile to

academic freedom .... The restraints on conscientious teachers are obvious .... That
very threat [posed by the breadth of the disclaimer oath] may
deter the flowering of
1

academic freedom as much as successive suits for perjury.

14

And, finding the breadth of the disability unwarranted because any proper
governmental concerns with security or with professional integrity could be
composed by more narrowly drawn rules not imposing these in terrorem effects
on academic freedom, the Court held the Maryland statutes void.
In Whitehill, Douglas thus employed the reference to academic freedom as
a reference to an understood, settled first amendment shield against the state
in its superintendence and control of public education, much in keeping with
his views dating from Adler, as well as in keeping with Justice Brennan's
Keyishian opinion in the same term of the Court. The proper fit, identifying
academic freedom with the first amendment, was made. The measured
protection of academic freedom from hostile state action had become a
settled feature of first amendment law.
Intermediately during this decade (1957-1967), moreover, two other cases
were resolved by the Supreme Court in which "academic freedom" appears,
although less centrally than in either Keyishian or Elkins. Both cases also
resulted in holding state statutes invalid on first and fourteenth amendment
grounds. The more relevant of the two cases, Baggett v. Bullitt, decided in
1964,115 had been brought by sixty-four members of the faculty, staff, and
student body at the University of Washington, who sued for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief from two state laws, the first of which applied
to all public employees, and the other only to teachers. The latter required a
broad affirmative oath "by precept and example [to] promote respect for the
112. That is, the objectionable effects are those bearing on the affected persons' professional
work as teachers (the "academic freedom" effects of the law). The obverse side of the same
regulatory coin would be the objectionable "free speech" effects of the law, that is, the extent to
which, insofar as one becomes a teacher subject to the disclaimer oath, one must then steer clear of
political associations and activities others remain free to pursue. For an elaboration of the
distinction, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of
Civil Liberty, in Edmund Pincoffs, ed, The Concept of Academic Freedom (Univ of Texas, 1972). For an

example of a federal regulation limiting first amendment rights of public employees but clearly not
implicating academic freedom, see United States Civil Service Commission v NationalAss'n of Letter Carriers,

413 US 548 (1973) (congressional restriction of civil service employees from certain forms of active
personal involvement in political campaigns, upheld).
113. 389 US at 60.
114. Id at 59 (emphasis added).
115. 377 US 360 (1964).
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flag and the institutions of the [United States and the] State."' 16 The
companion statute, applicable to all public employees, imposed a broad
disclaimer oath denying that the employee was a "subversive person," defined
as one who knowingly joins or knowingly remains a member of any group that
"advocates, abets, advises, or teaches any person" seeking to alter the form of
state or national government by force or violence.
As neither statute had yet been construed by the state supreme court,
Justices Harlan and Clark thought the case premature. In their view, the
statutes were open to a narrow interpretation that might disarm them of any
undue chilling effects. Writing for seven members of the Court, however,
Justice White disagreed and held the statutes void in light of their immediate
impact on those required to take and abide by the oaths. Moreover, the
examples Justice White gave of the objectionable downstream effects likely to
be generated by the statutes were examples of professional, anti-academic
freedom steering effects,' 17 as distinct from ordinary anti-free speech effects.
Significantly, too, in voiding the acts, Justice White noted:
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the professors ... and the
interests of the students at the University in academic freedom are fully protected by a
judgment in favor of the teaching personnel,
we have no occasion to pass on the
l8
standing of the students to bring this suit.I

This passing remark merits more than a few words of its own. Students were
not subject to either of the statutes, that is, students were not subject to any
oath or other constraint under either statute. Yet students had presumed to
appear as parties in interest to have both statutes declared void. What was
their standing to do so? It was certainly not to stand in for the faculty (several
faculty were already plaintiffs in the case). But the Students claimed a separate
(albeit related) standing because of what they alleged to be the direct effects
of the laws on their own academic freedom. That is, the students claimed that
the faculty would be inhibited by in terrorem effects of the oath from giving a
full professional account of themselves in educational relationships with the
students. Their claim as students was that it was not constitutionally
permissible for the State of Washington to attempt to structure their
education by putting the faculty under duress to compromise their
professional interaction with students. Taken on its own terms, their claim of
learning freedom was straightforward and strong. Justice White did not treat
it as frivolous. To the contrary, his point is that since the academic freedom
interests of the students were vindicated through the judgment in favor of the
faculty plaintiffs, it was not necessary to determine whether the students could
116. 1955 Act, Wash Laws 1955, ch 377, 1931 Act, Wash Laws 1931, ch 103.
117. 377 US at 369-72 (examples include a faculty editor's reluctance to edit any scholarly journal
with articles by Communist scholars from apprehension of appearing to act inconsistently with his
oath; a reluctance to consult with such persons or attend a convention or present a paper with such
persons present; an inhibition in class on any critical treatment of existing institutions, as
inconsistent with the separate oath committing one affirmatively to promote respect for such
institutions by precept and example).
118. Idat 366n5.
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have successfully maintained the action even if no faculty had been willing to
come forward (perhaps from fear of targeting themselves).' 19
The student academic freedom claim, so identified in Baggett, albeit
obliquely, is notable. It is not in tension with the claim of academic freedom
advanced in the same case by the affected faculty. Rather, the two are exactly
consistent in seeking an educational environment in which the good faith
critical professional skills of the faculty are not foreclosed by hostile state
action from being available to the students in the manner of instruction they
receive and their professional interaction with the faculty. We shall shortly
see several other cases where the argument is taken up (it might usefully have
appeared much earlier, for example, in Scopes). The last case we note between
1957 and 1967, however, was not litigated along such lines.
At issue in the remaining case of this period, Shelton v. Tucker,1 20 decided in
1960, was an Arkansas statute 12 1 requiring every teacher in each statesupported school or college annually to submit a list of all organizations in
which the teacher had held membership or to which the teacher had
contributed financially during the preceding five years, as a condition of
continuing eligibility for (re)appointment each year. A number of
noncomplying public school teachers and state college faculty members sued
to have the requirement enjoined. Unlike any of the cases thus far reviewed,
the requirement assailed in Shelton simply sought the requested information;
that is, it did not probe the teaching of the faculty, impose any sort of
disclaimer oath, or render anyone ineligible on grounds of any particular
affiliation (knowing or otherwise). Nonetheless, on a closely divided (five-tofour) vote, the Supreme Court struck the statute down on first amendment
overbreadth grounds.
Four Justices, including Frankfurter, found nothing facially amiss with the
state requirement. In certain respects, moreover, the generality of the annual
reporting requirement was arguably a point in its favor; the requirement did
not imply that only certain affiliations or some affiliations more than others
might trigger additional investigation and inquiry. Nor did it steer one away
from certain groups, causes, parties, or political action groups.
For Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justices Harlan, Whittaker, and Clark),
this was enough to conclude that the suit was premature. In the event that
any public school or state college faculty members might be able to show
subsequently that any of them, after complying, were not renewed in the
course of annual review because of hostile use by school administrators of the
information disclosed as an incident of the required annual listing, it would be
119.

The claim, in first amendment terms, is entirely as appropriate for the students to assert in

this kind of setting as an equivalent claim brought on behalf of students to contest the racial
assignment of teaching staff also affecting the conditions of the education the state chooses to
provide. For an example of just such a claim, see Rogers v Paul, 382 US 198 (1965). And for an
insightful general discussion, see Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum L Rev 277,
297-304 (1984).
120. 364 US 479 (1960).
121. Second Extraordinary Session of Ark Gen Assembly of 1958, Act 10.
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timely then, and not earlier, to check the statute's application on strict first
amendment grounds. Since, however, the comprehensive disclosure
requirement was on its face relatable to at least some few uses that might be
entirely proper (for example, some kinds of organizational affiliations or
contributions could provide grounds for concern arising from apparent
conflicts of interest, or at least furnish reason for inquiry), the teachers could
not claim a first amendment right to associational secrecy. For Justice
Frankfurter, in brief, the teachers' claims went too far. In defending his
position, moreover, Frankfurter also made the following observation: "If I
dissent from the Court's disposition in these cases, it is not because I put a
low value on academic freedom ....

It is because that very freedom, in its

most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the careful and
discriminating selection of teachers."' 12 2 The majority, in reaching the
opposite conclusion on the main issue, was not overall at odds with
Frankfurter's general view. Rather, the majority emphasized that the lack of
any tenure system under Arkansas law put every teacher at fresh risk each
year, with no burden on a nonrenewing school to do more than send notice
that the services of a given teacher were no longer desired without obligation
to say why. Against the factual background of recent massive resistance to
desegregation in Arkansas, and the expressed anxiety of the plaintiffs that in
these circumstances the disclosure laws would intimidate teachers affected by
them to abandon membership and financial support for certain voluntary
organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People rather than face the risk of covert retaliatory use of the
information they would be required to supply, the majority held that the
state's interests in forced disclosure were insufficient to sustain the
requirement on its face. They regarded the requirement as too
indiscriminate. Emphasizing the lack of confidentiality, the lack of procedural
protections (that is, tenure), and the general atmosphere of public hostility,
and quoting elaborately from Wieman and from Sweezy, the Court struck down
the Arkansas statute. Principally, however, the emphasis of the decision is
more of a piece with the opinion in Picketing, since its stress is on the rights of
those who teach not to be put under duress to forego ordinary political rights
of association and citizen speech. Only secondarily is Shelton an academic
freedom case.
B.

(1968-1978)

Nine cases in the Supreme Court report usages of "academic freedom" in
constitutional litigation during the eleven years bounding 1968-1978. As in
the preceding section, not all are equally germane. But part of what one gains
from an unhurried review is some clearer sense of what counts as an academic
freedom interest, as against an ordinary (albeit strong) free speech concern as
such. So it is not useless to see some instances of the distinction at work, as in
122.

364 US at 495-96.
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some measure we already have. As we have already had occasion to notice,
moreover, there are instances in which both descriptions of the interest at
1 3
issue may be opposite.
Some of the cases decided during this period are separately interesting,
moreover, in reporting constitutional usages of academic freedom entangled
with other constitutional clauses and issues. As one example, two cases
measure the extent to which conditions of academic freedom or the lack
thereof may limit the extent to which church-affiliated schools and universities
may or may not receive direct fiscal support disbursed by the state. As a
different example, the last case we consider here, Board of Regents of The
University of California v. Bakke, draws on a claim of academic freedom in
attempting to reconcile a state university admissions policy with the
fourteenth amendment. The issue addressed by the Court in Bakke is the
extent to which public universities may use race as a partial determinant of
who shall attend the state university, claiming the power to do so as a valid
exercise of academic freedom. But we begin with something much more
obviously connected to the first amendment, the Court's 1969 decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines School District.124 Tinker was a major decision arising under
the first amendment, importing free speech rights onto the premises of public
schools in a manner and to an extent not previously secured in any decision
by the Supreme Court.
At issue in Tinker was a claim brought on behalf of three public high school
and junior high school students (respectively sixteen, fifteen, and thirteen
years old). Through their parents, who warmly supported their children's
actions, they sued in federal court to forestall school penalties from being
imposed upon them following their suspension for defiance of a school
district rule forbidding armbands from being worn on campus. The plaintiffs'
position was that the rule was an unwarranted restriction on their rights of
personal and political expression. That the restriction was limited to the
premises of the school, they insisted, did not mean that it should therefore be
sustained. Rather, plaintiffs argued, absent some justification more
compelling than a flat policy preference to disallow such activity on school
grounds, the rule ought to be seen as an impermissible prior restraint on their
rights of free speech. By a majority of seven to two (Justices Black and Harlan
dissenting in separate opinions), the Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas held that the first amendment did
apply directly to the public school premises, that is, that no cordon sanitaire
could be thrown up around it forbidding political expression on the premises
by those in attendance during the school day. This first holding was a major
step by the Court, quite similar in respect to students, to Sullivan in respect to
the press. No previous case had gone so far. Then, advancing to the
particular facts of the case, Justice Fortas held that the activities of the
students (wearing black armbands on school grounds during the school day as
123.
124.

See, for example, note 112 and accompanying text.
393 US 503 (1969).
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a personal, silent expression of reproach of U.S. engagement in Vietnam)
were not subject to school restriction beyond that reasonably necessary to
keep them from disrupting the program and activities of the school. Justice
Fortas concluded that the scanty record did not reveal sufficient evidence of
anything the school
board might have relied on stronger than an
"undifferentiated"' ' 25 anxiety of adverse reaction to the students' behavior,
and that this was simply not enough under the circumstances. The lower
court decision was reversed.
In practical effect, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a declaratory
judgment entitling them to talk politics on their high school or junior high
school campus-even by wearing armbands-in the absence of identifiable
clear signs of adverse effects that might justify more tailored restrictions by
the school administration. 126 In the course of his wide-ranging opinion (two
Justices concurred only narrowly), moreover, Justice Fortas wrote
aggressively in criticism of student speech-restrictive public school board
policies at large. He prefaced his analysis with the following passages, which
came to be much quoted in other cases:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years.[ 1 2 7] . .. In our system, state operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism. [S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may
not be confined to the
12 8
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.

Some of the Court's phrases in these passages fit well with strong academic
freedom claims (for example, "[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not
be enclaves of totalitarianism . . . students may not be regarded as closed-

29
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate").
They fit well, that is, with several points we have already derived in relating
student and faculty academic freedom from Baggett, Keyishian, and cases of a
like sort. They match up strongly also with other portions of our general
review: that like the post, the state may give up public education when it
chooses; but while carrying it on, the state is not sole master of what students
are free to learn, whether on their own initiative or in interaction with those
free to teach.

125. Id at 508.
126. It is likely that a restriction on carrying one's political insignia into the classroom might well
have been sustained, though a campuswide ban per se fails.
127. This was not entirely true. Indeed, Tinker's significance was that it established for the first
time that, in some measure, public school premises cannot be restricted as a forum for political
expression by students. Since Tinker there has been some erosion, though Tinker has not been
overruled. See, for example, Bethel School District No. 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986) (student

disciplined for off-color remarks as part of campus campaign speech on behalf of another student;
Tinker heavily qualified). See also Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260 (1988) (principal's

unilateral and substantial censorship of student-managed, faculty-supervised newspaper sustained, 5

to 4).
128.

Tinker, 393 US at 506, 511.

129.

Id at 511 (emphasis added).
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Still, allowing for all this, Tinker is not focused on academic freedom,13 0
certainly not in the profile that has thus far stretched from Adler through
Keyishian, Whitehill, and Baggett. Rather, Tinker represents a strong first
amendment judgment by the Court respecting general free speech claims by
students during hours of compulsory attendance at publicly run schools,
rather than anything more subtle. It is an example of a strong view of general
3
first amendment free speech rights in an open society, but not more.' '
Four years after Tinker, in 1972, the Court reviewed a related first
amendment claim by a group of college students in Healy v. James. 13 2 A
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS") had applied for official
recognition as a student organization at Central Connecticut State College
("CCSC") in 1969. That status was sought in order to qualify the
organization to place announcements of meetings or rallies in the student
newspaper, to post notices on campus bulletin boards, and "most
importantly'' 3 3 (to quote Justice Powell), to use campus facilities for holding
meetings. Recognized groups already included the Young Republicans,
Young Democrats, Young Americans for Freedom, and the Liberal Party.
Despite a six-to-two vote by the college Student Affairs Committee (four
students, three faculty, and the dean of students) recommending approval,
the college president disapproved the group's application.
The student organizers sued in federal district court to enjoin, on first
amendment grounds, the president's refusal. The president defended his
decision on the basis that a line should be drawn disallowing campus status
"to any group that 'openly repudiates' the College's dedication to academic
freedom,"'' 3 4 which, arguably, SDS did. SDS chapters had been involved in
episodes of trashing and disruption at some other colleges. In the SDS view,
colleges as well many other social, economic, and political structures in the
United States were rigged against the interests of the poor. SDS was itself
skeptical and contemptuous of the conventional view of academic freedom, a
view they regarded as protecting the status quo. Influenced strongly by
Herbert Marcuse's writings (for example, Repressive Tolerance 135), many SDS
members believed that prevailing first amendment doctrine was itself vicious
130. The sole actual mention of academic freedom in Tinker is a footnote reference to a law
review note, Note, Academic Freedom, 81 Harv L Rev 1045 (1968) (using the phrase in its title). 393 US
at 506 n2.
131. The dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan is useful in elaborating this point. Id at 526. Also,
in saying that "'teachers[do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech . . . at the
schoolhouse gate," id at 506, Justice Fortas is correct in the sense the Pickering case shows. The
dictum may seem to go further, however, and to imply that public school teachers may also use
school premises as the students used them, for example, to wear political armbands; but that is
doubtful (nor would academic freedom necessarily embrace the idea). Rather, it is likely a public
school rule forbidding teachers to wear political armbands or buttons during working hours on
school premises or in classrooms would-and should-be sustained.
132. 408 US 169 (1972).
133. Id at 176.
134. Id.
135. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. & Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pire Tolerance 80117 (Beacon Press, 1969).
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because it enabled entrenched elites to exploit others by perpetuating a myth
of an open marketplace of ideas, which the elites dominated for their own
ends. SDS did not agree that moral people should tolerate the free
circulation of evil ideas; rather, moral people should act to disrupt their
presentation when necessary to prove they were no longer acceptable in the
classroom or anywhere else.
Despite all this, however, in seeking recognition at CCSC, the SDS chapter
had actually filed an unprepossessing statement of educational purposes.
When pressed for further information as to whether they might engage in
interrupting classes, they replied only that their action would "be dependent
upon each issue."' 3 6 The president decided that this was not adequate and
disapproved their request. After still further campus hearings on the question
of recognition (hearings mandated by the district court), the president
renewed his disapproval on grounds that recognition of the SDS chapter
would be "contrary to... orderly process[es] of change" and would present a
"disruptive influence" to the college.' 3 7 The district court sustained the
president. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed in an opinion written by Justice Powell.
In his opinion, Powell quoted Tinker and declared: "At the outset we note
that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of
the First Amendment. [W]e break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."'13 8
Then, after noting that the student organization had complied with the
college's filing requirements and that the president's adverse decision
operated as a prior restraint under the circumstances, Justice Powell placed
the burden of justification on the college and held that it had not been met.
Any risk of disruption or intimidation was inchoate, not sufficiently clear nor
present to justify refusing to allow the chapter to form and meet on campus.
The philosophy of the organization, even assuming it countenanced violence
and disruption, "affords no reason" for disallowing it to persuade others of
the truth of its point of view, so long as it in fact operated on campus in an
orderly fashion, even as the Young Democrats or Young Americans for
Freedom already did.3 9 Powell's statement was exceedingly strong in
applying the first amendment. It virtually repeated the position Holmes and
Brandeis had taken a half century earlier as a general first amendment rule:
"Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a philosophy of 'destruction' [is]
immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed
40
by any group to be abhorrent."'
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Healy, 408 US at 173.
Id at 179.
Id at 180 (citations omitted).
Id at 187.
Id.
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Concern with respect to actual acts of disruption or actual acts of
intimidation, or with respect to acts to deprive others of their opportunity to
speak or be heard, is entirely proper, Powell declared firmly for the Court.
But, quoting from Tinker again, Powell held that definite actions, or at least
discernible threats of such actions, must materialize to warrant sanctions by
the college, including revocation of recognition. A ban of the organization in
advance of any untoward activity or any specific threat could not stand,
consistent with the fourteenth amendment's application of the first
amendment to the state college.
At the end, Powell hedged only in one respect. The decisions of the lower
courts were reversed, but the case was remanded for further proceedings to
determine whether the SDS group would express a minimal willingness to be
bound by such campus regulations as the Court had already indicated the
college might maintain and strictly enforce (against disruption, invasion of
classrooms, or interference with other speakers, for example). The Court
thus left the possibility open that the group might be banned if,
notwithstanding a request to do so, it declined to submit a statement of
willingness to be bound by the valid rules that the college maintained for the
protection of academic freedom and for general order on campus.1 41
Healy, even more than Tinker, is an exceptionally strong first amendment
decision, albeit confined to state colleges (as Tinker is confined to public
schools). Neither implies that unaffiliated outside groups may willy-nilly
wedge themselves onto public school or state college premises. On the other
hand, neither case (certainly, not Healy) permits the college to draw a sharp
line according to the ideological auspices of student groups free to claim
campus breathing space of their own up to the point of actual threats, acts of
intimidation, actual acts of disruption, or interference with the educational
program or rights of others on campus, as both cases are at pains to say. A
concurring opinion by Justice Douglas carried the point even farther than did
that by Justice Powell. Douglas defended the radical heterodoxy of student
groups as a check even as to the faculty itself:
141. Extracting such a commitment to observe the rules necessarily puts groups such as SDS
under a strain. In the circumstances, the act of making such an affirmative expression is inconsistent
with the group's view that such rules are not entitled to respect (because, in SDS's opinion, they
constitute a parliamentary facade by means of which dominant classes maintain elite control). It may
be argued that refusal to express acceptance of such rules may not be sufficient grounds to ban the
group, though enforcement of the rules would be utterly sound. The problem is akin to a pledge of
allegiance test. Compare these two statements:
(a) In applying for recognition on campus, we accept and agree to observe all college rules
applicable to recognized student organizations;
(b) In applying for recognition on campus, we acknowledge that the College has a set of
rules applicable to recognized student organizations, and we understand that we will
not be regarded by the College as exempt from them.
The second form effectively records the fact of notice of the rules; it makes clear that recognition
in no way implies waiver by the college of its rules. The first form, requiring acceptance of the rules,
however, seeks a concession respecting the accepted legitimacy of the rules; somewhat like a "pledge
of allegiance," it is more doubtful on that same account.
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Some [of the faculty] have narrow specialities that are hardly relevant to modern
times. History has passed others by, leaving them interesting relics of a bygone day.
More often than not they represent those who withered under the pressures of
McCarthyism or other forces of conformity and represent but a timid replica of those
who once brought distinction to the ideal of academic freedom.' 4 2

At least passingly related to Tinker and to Healy, moreover, is Jones v. State
Board of Education,143 denied review in the Supreme Court in 1970. At issue in
the case was a petition for certiorari, brought by a state college student who
had been suspended by the college. He claimed it was done solely because he
distributed a campus pamphlet for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee ("SNCC"), urging a student registration boycott-an activity he
claimed the first amendment protected. After hearing oral argument, the
Court dismissed the petition for lack of sufficient evidence in the record
regarding the actual basis of the student's suspension (it appeared in the
course of oral argument before the Court that he may have been suspended
for having lied to the campus disciplinary committee rather than for having
distributed the pamphlet). So, technically, the case altogether washed out.
But one Justice, Douglas, filed a dissent.
Douglas did not relate the student's actions to academic freedom (the
phrase "academic freedom" actually appears solely in the student's pamphlet,
reprinted in the case), but his opinion treats those actions as protected by the
first amendment nevertheless. That the pamphlet statements may have been
"ill-tempered and in bad taste," or "even strongly abusive,"' 14 4 Douglas says,
may not on those grounds enable the state college to have the pamphleteer
suspended or dismissed. On the other hand, Douglas insisted, "[t]his does
not mean that free speech can be used with impunity as an excuse to break up
classrooms, to destroy the quiet and decorum of convocations, or to bar the
constitutional privileges of others to meet together in matters of common
concern." 4 5 In brief, the Douglas opinion does not break new ground, but it
does represent a very strong view of student-citizen, on-campus free speech.
Tinker, Healy, and Jones are, in sum, strong first amendment cases. All treat
students as possessing assertable first amendment rights on campus. All
involve student engagement in some conspicuous form of personal political
expression. In many respects, their parallelism to Sullivan and Pickering is
quite complete: they are animated by a strong first amendment breathing
space rationale extended in three dimensions at once.
The first dimension is in the holding that the first amendment disallows
public authority to cordon off public school or public college premises by any
strict limitation restricting students in attendance to "educationally germane"
speech alone; it appears specifically in the Court's express, reiterated
proposition that students need not leave their involvement in general political
142.
143.
144.
145.

Healy, 408 US at 196-97.
396 US 817, cert dism, 397 US 31, reh denied 397 US 1018 (1970).
397 US at 33 (Douglas dissenting).
Id at 33-34.
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debate at the school gate. 146 The second dimension of the breathing space
rationale is that the extent to which the first proposition holds true is more
substantial than one might have supposed, in both a procedural and in a
substantive sense. So, the cases suggest, procedural limitations (for example,
those generally concerned with time, place, and manner of on-campus
expression) must not sweep wider than reasonably warranted in order to
avoid material kinds of interference with the orderly campus environment.
Both Tinker and Healy (and certainly Douglas's dissent in Jones) strongly so
suggest. Substantively, the rules may generally not pick and choose
"acceptable" philosophies to be presented on campus through student oncampus expression; nor, evidently, may common forum advantages of
operating on campus (for example, as a recognized student group) be
withheld because of misgivings associated with a particular group's
ideological bent or because of strong public disapproval. Third, these
propositions evidently hold, in some degree, even in respect to quite young
persons (for example, in Tinker, one of the students was only thirteen). While
it may be doubtful whether these first amendment beachheads involve student
academic freedom in any ordinary understanding (that is, compare these cases
with the academic freedom student claim in Baggett), one may rightly pause in
thinking the matter through. They do assure students of some right to
fashion what is in some loose sense a constitutionally protected cocurriculum
on campus-the teaching agendas and learning experiences of their own
actions-carried on in a manner that may well influence the official
curriculum as well. Obliquely, therefore, if not directly, they do secure a kind
of anarchistic student academic freedom under first amendment auspices one
might be mistaken to discount or dismiss.
Two years after the dismissal of certiorari in Jones, the Court denied
certiorari in a case in which Justice Douglas again dissented, President's Council
v. Community School Board.14 7 The case is an inconclusive forerunner to an
address by the full Court of the same issues in 1982,148 but Douglas's dissent
is noteworthy because it bears intimately on his exceptional views in Healy and
Jones. It also virtually completes the twenty-year cycle of Douglas opinions on
the larger subject, beginning with his seminal dissent in the 1952 Adler case,
the first explicit use of academic freedom in the Supreme Court.
President's Council had been commenced in federal district court by a
combination of plaintiffs: a junior high school principal, a librarian from one
of the affected schools, and several parents suing for themselves and their
children. 149 Their object was to secure a mandatory injunction ordering the
146. Tinker, 393 US 503.
147. 457 F2d 289 (2d Cir 1972), cert denied, 409 US 998 (1972).
148. Board of Educ., Island Trees v Pico, 457 US 853 (1982); see notes 237-49 and accompanying
text.
149. Had the publisher and author joined the case as plaintiffs, the additional issue would have
been joined whether their freedom of speech and press interest-to reach willing readers-was
violated by the state action interposed by the school board's banishment of the book from public
school library shelves. (To frame the issue in this way is not to imply a certain answer, but it may
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school board to return a particular book 150 to the school library shelves, from
which the school board had ordered it removed.
Noting that the book remained available to those students presenting a
written request by their parents, the court of appeals (in affirming the district
court's dismissal of the case) held that the alleged violation of academic
freedom was no more than "miniscule" (sic), if real at all: the court regarded
the whole matter to be much too trivial to "elevate this intramural strife to
first amendment constitutional proportions." 1 '5
Dissenting from the
Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari, however, Douglas strongly
disagreed:
Academic freedom has been upheld against attack on various fronts .... The first
amendment is a preferred right and is of great importance in the schools .... Are we
sending children to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we
educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the5 past, to explore all forms of thought,
and to find solutions to our world's problems?'

Douglas left it quite unclear whose academic freedom (presumably that of
the students?) had been abridged. We shall see later, in the Court's treatment
of the 1982 Pico decision, what became of this species of dispute when it was
more fully discussed. The first amendment importance of the dissent is that
Douglas regarded the school board action as reviewable at least to see
whether the state was acting through its public school system to restrict the
availability of ideas out of a community preference for insulating conventional
wisdom from critical appraisal (albeit in the form of a particular book on the
library shelf rather than in the form of the remarks of a classroom teacher); it
is not at all clear that he was wide of the mark in voting to have the Court take
a closer look at the case. Indeed, his dissent is related in this respect to a
15 3
major Supreme Court case of this same period, Epperson v. Arkansas,
decided in 1968.
Epperson was a reprise on Scopes; it dealt with a virtually identical state
criminal statute, adopted in Arkansas the year after the Tennessee court had
sustained the Tennessee act. Like that act, the Arkansas statute forbade
any teacher... in any University, College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of
the State, which is supported in whole or in part from public funds . . .to teach the
theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order
of animals
54
[or to use any textbook] that teaches the [same theory or doctrine]. 1

Notwithstanding this statute, a public school teacher, Susan Epperson, did
assign such a textbook for use in her high school biology class; she sued in
state court for a declaratory judgment to determine whether she could use the
provide an additional first amendment link with the other plaintiffs asserting compatible interests in
lifting the ban.)
150.

Piri Thomas, Down These Mean Streets (Knopf, 1967).

151. 457 F2d 289, 292 (2d Cir 1972).
152. President's Council, 409 US at 999-1000 (Douglas dissenting).
153. 393 US 97 (1968).
154. Ark Stat Ann §§ 80-1627 to 1628 (1960 Repl Vol). Note that just as was true of the
Tennessee statute, the restriction also applied at the university level. That being so, any suggestion
that the statute merely meant to shield especially young children from emotional conflict (between
subjects addressed in school and family loyalties) would seem entirely farfetched.
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textbook without threat of discharge or criminal prosecution. The state
chancery court, responding to the numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions
we have previously canvassed, held that the state could not "restrict the
freedom to learn, and restrain the freedom to teach" by categorical criminal
law censorship of this sort, even within its own schools and colleges.' 5 5 As it
was to turn out, however, only the state chancery court's opinion applied first
amendment-academic freedom as the principal basis for decision; somewhat
ironically, and altogether anticlimactically, neither the state supreme court
nor the U.S. Supreme Court did.
The state supreme court gave the entire case short shrift. In a twosentence per curiam reversal of the chancery court, the state supreme court
treated the state as free to set the terms of teaching and learning in public
schools and public universities as it wished (just as the Tennessee Supreme
Court had done in the 1920s); it peremptorily upheld the restriction as "a
valid exercise of the state's power to specify the curriculum in its public
schools."' 156 In brief, the Arkansas Supreme Court treated the teachers as
confinable in their classroom coverage exactly as the state legislature
preferred; correspondingly, the dependent freedom of the students, in their
interactive learning relationships with the teachers, was implicitly cut off as
well. Epperson thus went to the Supreme Court as an excellent first
amendment academic freedom case. The case was as strong-perhaps
stronger-than that joining the issues we noted in Baggett v. Bullitt, 15 7 albeit
drawn in the setting of secondary education, rather than in state colleges and
universities.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Fortas (writing for six members of the
Court) initially addressed the case in strong first amendment, academic
freedom terms. He invoked Keyishian 158 and Shelton v. Tucker 159 to settle the
full relevance of the first amendment to the classroom. He likewise referred
to Meyer, 16 0 describing it as a case in which "the Court did not hesitate to
condemn under the Due Process Clause 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the
freedom of teachers to teach and of students to learn."' 6' But, having set up
the case in these strong, promising terms, Justice Fortas then deflected the
actual decision into a narrower channel. He concluded that it was not
necessary to strengthen the constitutional constraint upon the powers of the
state government to operate public schools and universities as it wished, even
though the state attorney made virtually no effort to defend the law (he more
or less desultorily adhered to the state supreme court's view that no defense
155. 393 US at 100, quoting unreported opinion of Chancery court.
156. 242 Ark 922, 416 SW2d 322 (1967).
157. 377 US 360. See note 115 and accompanying text.
158. 385 US 589 (1967).
159. 364 US 479 (1960).
160. 262 US 390 (1923).
161. Epperson, 393 US at 105. This was, however, slightly careless ofJustice Fortas; Meyer, it will
be remembered, dealt with an effort to restrict German language instruction in private schools, not
(merely) public schools, as here.
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was needed-that is, that the state could do as it liked as to its own schools
and colleges-a view clearly incorrect under pre-existing Supreme Court
decisions). Rather, Justice Fortas concluded, whatever valid reasons a state
might adduce in some circumstances, to justify the way it has allocated scarce
educational resources or has taken into account the age of students (for
example, the appropriateness of reserving some subjects to higher age
groups), no such considerations accounted for the categorical, across-theboard exclusion at issue. Instead, Fortas held, the Arkansas statute had no
purpose other than to serve the interests of the dominant religious faith of the
region by forbidding public classroom instruction inconsistent with its
tenets. 16 2 A legislative preference merely to protect a dominant religion is
disallowed as contrary to the first amendment's establishment clause.
Accordingly, the court struck down the Arkansas statute specifically on that
63

ground. 1

The decision in Epperson, however, was weakened by the surprising
concurrence filed by Justice Black (surprising because, along with Justice
Douglas, Black had been most forceful in the long list of academic freedom
cases and regulations in the 1950s and 1960s). In Justice Black's view, the
statute was void only because the state supreme court had left it uncertain
whether a teacher was "forbidden to mention Darwin's theory at all or [was
forbidden only] from contending that it was true."' t
If the statute meant to
prohibit any mention, then, while it might be valid as thus understood, the
state court needed to make clear the extent of the statutory prohibition, in
order that teachers not be made to guess. For Black, therefore, the vice of the
162. Id at 107. Note, again, that the statute applied uniformly to public higher education as much
as to secondary education in Arkansas, thus-on its face-proposing no distinction in respect to
secondary education, that is, no basis for crediting a rationale applicable to the one level of schools
vis-i-vis the other, since the legislature made no such distinction at all. The foreclosure of any
academic presentation respecting evolution of the species (like the equivalent banning of books,
journals, or other publications containing like material through the mails) should be the easiest kind
of first amendment case under these circumstances. Of course, to the extent that the restriction was
also enacted because those having the power to do so wanted the topic and materials suppressed as a
set of blasphemous ideas, Fortas was not wrong to fault the statute separately under the
establishment clause. (The case is no different in that regard than the use of state power to forbid
the publication or republication of Galileo's telescopic evidence tending to confirm Copernican
astronomy; that the ban is limited to state-supported educational institutions should make no
difference at all.) For a recent and excellent review of blasphemy and the first amendment, see
Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Calif
L Rev 297 (1988).
163. There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to
require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any
religious sect or dogma .... In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has
sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary
to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to
the origin of man.... No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens .... The
law's effort was . . . an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed
conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.
393 US at 106-09. Justice Fortas's sole usage of "academic freedom" appears in footnote citations of
law journal titles (id nn 10, 13).
164. Id at 112 (Black concurring).
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law was its threat of criminal sanctions against one who might guess wrong;
putting teachers at risk in that way was unfair-a denial of due process.
At one point, Justice Black made an unexceptionable observation that
teachers may not, as a matter of constitutional right, commandeer the
classroom in whatever way suits their fancy. 165 At another point, however, he
veered very much in the direction of moving all the way from that undisputed
basic proposition virtually to the rhetoric of the right-privilege distinction the
Court had long since rejected:
I am ...not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with him
into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic, political, or
religious subjects that the school's managers do not want discussed.... I question
whether it is absolutely certain, as the Court's opinion indicates, that "academic
freedom" permits a teacher to breach his contractual agreement to teach only the
166
subjects designated by the school authorities who hired him.

As though to underscore the extreme implications of Justice Black's view
(and to separate himself from them), Justice Stewart authored a separate, onepage concurring opinion. Stewart distanced himself from Justice Black by
declaring that he believed it would violate the first amendment's free speech
clause (not merely the establishment clause) for a state statute to forbid public
school teachers "so much as to mention the very existence of an entire system
of respected human thought" (he expressly includes "Darwin's theory"); he
then wrote that "since Arkansas may, or may not, have done just that, I
conclude the statute before us is so vague as to be invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 6 7 To restate his proposition accurately, had it
been clear that the statute did forbid any mention of Darwin's theory in the
treatment of subjects to which it would be relevant, Justice Stewart would
have held the statute invalid on that account-not for vagueness (Justice
Black's sole objection) but for unconstitutional overbreadth (an objection Black
evidently would not have endorsed). And that objection, consistent with the
pre-existing case law of the Court on academic freedom and the first
amendment, certainly seems correct.
Indeed, in a roundabout but nonetheless instructive fashion, two principal
cases decided by the Court during this decade strongly confirm Justice
Stewart's position in Epperson. The earlier case, Tilton v. Richardson,' 68 was
decided in 1971. It reviewed the substantive constitutionality of an act of
Congress providing for capital construction grants for which private as well as
public colleges and universities were eligible; the grants were targeted for
specified kinds of campus buildings and facilities such as classrooms, science
laboratories, and libraries. The immediate question was whether religiously
affiliated colleges could participate in these grants despite the first
amendment provision respecting the separation of church and state. In a
closely divided vote, five-to-four, the Supreme Court held that they could.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Idat 113.
Idat 113-14.
Id at 116 (Stewart concurring).
403 US 672 (1971).
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Significantly, in sustaining the constitutional eligibility of the particular
religiously affiliated colleges and universities at risk in the case, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, expressly used academic freedom as the
constitutional litmus test: whether despite the formal governance of certain
colleges by religious bodies, they were nonetheless "characterized by an
atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination" such
that they compared favorably with other eligible institutions in that respect
and ought not be characterized as primarily agencies of a church. 16 9 So, at
various points in his opinion, the Chief Justice noted that non-Catholics were
71
admitted as students,' 70 that non-Catholics were members of the faculty,'
that the schools "introduced evidence that they made no attempt to
indoctrinate students or to proselytize,"'172 that none required attendance at
religious services, 17 3 and that the theology courses "are taught according to
the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher's concept of
professional standards."1 7 4 In elaborating on these observations, he went on:
[T]hese four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of academic
freedom and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in fact
followed. . . . Although appellants introduced several institutional documents that
stated certain religious restrictions on what could be taught, other evidence showed
that these restrictions were not in fact enforced and that the schools were
characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious
indoctrination. All four institutions, for example, subscribe to the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure endorsed by the American Association
of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges.... Many churchrelated colleges and universities are characterized by a high degree of academic
75
freedom and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their students.'

In the related case decided five years later, Roemer v. Maryland Public Works
Board,176 the same requirement was (nominally) applied. The case involved a
taxpayer challenge to a state funding program under which private colleges
within the state might apply for state financial aid equal to 15 percent of the
per-student amount provided to the state college system. Writing for a
plurality of the Court, Justice Blackmun first observed that more than twothirds of the eligible private colleges had no religious affiliation (the point of
his observation being, presumably, to negative any suggestion that the
program was but a disguised effort to support religious institutions). Then, as
to those having such an affiliation, he noted, each was characterized by a
"high degree of institutional autonomy," none received funds from or
reported to the Catholic Church, and "[e]ach college subscribe[d] to, and
abide[d] by, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom of the
American Association of University Professors."' 77 Again, the proposition
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id at 681.
Id at 686.
Idat687.
Id.
Id.
Idat686.
Id at 681-82, 686.
426 US 736 (1976).
Id at 755-56.
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was that these are appropriate expectations a court or a public agency would
use to measure the constitutional eligibility for state assistance of private

colleges and universities. Moreover, no member of the Court in either case
entertained the proposition that state schools, controlled directly by
government, could somehow be exempt from these standards of academic
freedom when private schools seeking public help would not be. Nor is there
any logical reason to explain why state schools should be exempt. In this
sense, then, Justice Stewart's view in Epperson also seems entirely sound, even

treating Epperson as a straightforward academic freedom case.' 7 8
As in Tilton and Roemer, express reference to the 1940 Joint Statement of
Principles (or, rather, an interpretative report of the 1940 Statement by
Committee A) also appeared in an additional Supreme Court case decided
during this period (1968-1978), reviewing a faculty member's first and
fourteenth amendment claims. The case, Board of Regents v. Roth, 179 was in
part a reprise of the Pickering case. As in Pickering, the terminated faculty
member sued for reinstatement on grounds that his termination (at the
Oshkosh campus of the University of Wisconsin) was prompted by his public
criticism of the university administration-criticism that, consistent with the

Court's decision in Pickering, he believed could not be used to affect his
appointment. The district court concluded that it was unnecessary to reach a
decision on that question (unlike Pickering, where the basis for the school
board's action was a matter of record, in Roth the regents did not admit that
the faculty member's public criticism was a consideration in their decision; the
burden thus fell on Roth to show that it was). Rather, the court held, Roth's

status on the faculty as a tenure track appointee sufficiently distinguished him
from a one year visitor or other kind of ad hoc contract appointee such that
some kind of intramural procedure prior to his effective termination was
178. The dissents in Tilton and Roemer did not disagree with the discussion in the text. Rather, the
dissents took strong exception to the majority's conclusions respecting the evidence used to describe
the private schools as truly satisfying the Court's own criteria. 403 US at 689 (Douglas dissenting);
426 US at 769-72 (Brennan dissenting); id at 772-74 (Stewart dissenting). And, at least in Roemer, the
dissents seem to have the better of the argument by far. For example, in Roemer, Justice Stewart
noted that in Tilton the Court found from the record positive evidence that "the theology courses
were taught as academic subjects," id at 773-74 (emphasis added); no such positive evidence was
produced in Roemer; further, in Roemer, all members of the religion or theology faculty at two of the
colleges were Catholic clerics-a point making the absence of positive findings (in respect to the
teaching of those courses) additionally disturbing. As far back as our discussion of the Adler case, see
notes 76-87 and accompanying text, note was taken of different (albeit often related and synergistic)
ways in which the state itself might offend the first amendment in respect to faculty staff and
academic freedom: not merely by direct command, or by chilling rule, as in Epperson on the one
hand and as in Adler on the other hand, but also by preshaping a faculty that is nominally otherwise
fully protected in its academic freedom. Stewart correctly identifies this issue, in Roemer, in this way:
"Recognition of the academic freedom of these instructors does not necessarily lead to a conclusion
that courses in the religion or theology departments at the five defendant [institutions] have no
overtones of indoctrination." Id at 774. The point is the obvious one, that is, the staffing criteria of
the college may already have done their work.
179. 408 US 564 (1972). See also Pery v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972) (Roth applied, faculty
member's aprofessional speech activities held to be protected by the first amendment, and case
remanded to determine whether quasi-tenure status was sufficient to trigger 14th amendment fair
hearing pretermination due process rights). In Roth, the express, favorable reference to the
Committee A Report appears at 408 US 579 n17.
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required in order to protect his academic freedom. The case advanced to the
Supreme Court to consider the procedural issue separately. The Supreme
Court then divided in three ways at once: one Justice (Douglas) agreed with
the district judge's reasoning and result; two (Brennan and Marshall) would
have gone even further to require hearings; and five voted, instead, to reverse.
In substantially agreeing with the district court, Justice Douglas reached a
set of conclusions urged in an amicus brief the AAUP filed in the case. 180 The
brief's emphasis was essentially in two parts. The first part noted the hazard
to academic freedom implicit in any peremptory power of the Wisconsin
regents to nonrenew a faculty member's appointment without explanation.
The second part noted that while tenure track appointees are necessarily at
risk in some ways that tenured faculty are not at risk, they are also unlike oneyear visitors or fixed-term contract appointees. Appointment on a tenure track
implies a more ongoing relationship than a simple term contract. The vast
majority of tenure track first-year appointment contracts are routinely
renewed precisely because the relationship is at this stage usually still
ongoing; it would be odd if tenure track appointees typically were
nonrenewed after a single year. This pattern held within the University of
Wisconsin system-almost no one other than Roth on tenure track
appointment was nonrenewed as early as he. The AAUP contended that the
protection of the academic freedom of these faculty members required that
before their tenure track status was ended, some procedural protection
should be available, just as the district court had held.' 8 ' The Douglas
opinion agreed. His own emphasis, moreover, was explicitly keyed to
substantive first amendment academic freedom concerns. 8 2 But the majority
185
reversed the district court, and remanded the case for retrial.
To be sure, the majority in Roth cast no retrospective doubt on its long
line of cases protecting academic freedom as a subset of first amendment
rights. Nor did it retract anything from its Pickering (free speech) line of cases.
Even though Roth's speech may have been more involved with citizen-interest
speech than with his teaching, research, or professional participation within
the university, the Court left no doubt that insofar as his nonrenewal was
improperly based on either sort of consideration, he could prevail in his
action, once he proved his claim. But the Court detached that means of
protecting his academic freedom-by suing and by proving affirmatively in
court the improper basis of the regents' action-from the claim that his tenure
track status entitled him to something more from the university than an
180. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 (1972) (No 71-162).
181. See Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 56 AAUP
Bull 21 (Spring 1970). See also Roth v Board of Regents, 310 F Supp 972, 979-80 (WD Wis 1970)
("Substantive constitutional protection for a university professor against non-retention in violation
of his First Amendment ights ...is useless without procedural safeguards."). (The AAUP position
was that such substantive constitutional protection was not "useless," but that it was nonetheless
incomplete under the circumstances.)
182. 408 US at 579-84 (Douglas dissenting).

183.

Id at 579.
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unexplained pink slip, if academic freedom was not to be put unfairly at risk
for persons in his position. Despite the AAUP's firm agreement with Roth,
the Court held that this claim came up short as a matter of fourteenth
amendment due process law. Effectively, the Court chose to regard Roth as
though he had been a one-year or other term appointee and not on the tenure
track at all, who had simply not been asked to stay on, despite the AAUP view
that this kind of comparison elides an essential difference and falsifies a
84
critical distinction in status and expectations.'
Given the Court's approach in Roth, however, this particular subject

remains a significant area of professional concern; the Constitution has come
around less than one might have hoped.' 8 5 Procedurally speaking, academic
freedom remains caught in a crevice of vulnerability. To the extent that
public sentiment prefers that those who teach shall be appointed only

pursuant to an indefinite series of closed-end contracts, each (in theory)
entirely new and terminal unto itself, without doubt the effect is necessarily

one of inhibiting any professional departure from uncontroversial methods
and substance, lest one find oneself out on the street with only a problematic
right to sue. Roth, in recognizing no distinction between such appointees and
tenure track faculty, widened that crevice even more. Given the common-

sense basis on which such faculty might have been distinguished from strict
term appointees (from whom they are in fact substantively distinguished in
general educational practice), and given also the Court's general express
emphasis on academic freedom as a core first amendment concern, Roth
184. In the AAUP view, tenure track appointees are by category and definition differently situated
as an ordinary legal matter than closed-term appointees, visitors, or, indeed, faculty at institutions
having no tenure system at all (for example, faculty all of whom never have anything more than each
annual dead-end contract, regardless of how many such previous dead-end contracts each might
already have had). Specifically, one who is appointed to a tenure track position in an institution
embracing a tenure system is receiving assurance by the appointment that, absent some perceived
deficiency in his or her professional performance, the expectation of appointment renewal and
eventual review for tenure is objectively reasonable. This, ordinarily, is what appointment to the full
time faculty on the tenure track means. (Exceptions qualifying that understanding are ordinarily few
in number, for example, institutionwide financial exigency or a serious decline of enrollment in the
department or discipline of one's specialty such that nonrenewal could occur though one's own work
was considered to have gone very well.)
185. Despite Roth, moreover, the Court has not applied its logic uniformly since 1972. See, for
example, Cleveland BoardofEduc. v Loudermill, 470 US 532 (1985); Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134 (1974).
(Both cases are, as noted by the dissents in each, indistinguishable from Roth; the status furnished the
public employee was described conterminously with the procedures laid out in advance for ending
that status, which procedures the public employer sedulously followed, exactly as in Roth.
Nevertheless, in Loudermill and in Arnett, the Court declined to treat the due process clause as selfreferentially limited. It held, rather, that whatever due process the due process clause itself would
require would have to be provided even if it was more than the state had promised.) Perhaps part of
the problem in Roth was the apparent failure of the AAUP adequately to stress to the Court the
substantial difference between tenure track and simple term contract academic appointees. Even so,
the total case law in this area is simply not consistent, even within itself, since Roth. (For four
different discussions, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4, 70-73 (1988); Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of
Government Benefits, 12J Legal Stud 3, 27 (1983); William W. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property"."
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L Rev 445 (1977); Frank I. Michaelman,
Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds,
Nomos XVIII 126 (New York Univ Press, 1977)).
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remains an anomalous exception in the sweep of the cases we have reviewed.
One reasonably could have expected it to come out the other way, even as the
district court supposed.
In contrast with Roth and its concern with academic freedom and due
process where an individual faculty member's position was in question is
Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,18 6 a highly publicized case decided
in 1978. It is also the last case within the 1968-1978 period of review in which
an express usage of "academic freedom" appears. The judgment in the Bakke
case was determined by a single Justice, Lewis Powell, in an opinion in which
no other member of the Court joined. 8 7 At issue in Bakke was an admissions
policy at the medical school of the University of California at Davis. Bakke
had applied and been refused admission in 1973 and 1974, though his
academic qualifications were substantially greater in every objective category
than those averaged by thirty-two other students who had been admitted but
with whom Bakke was never compared. 88 Under the policy approved by the
medical school faculty, he was not permitted to be compared with any of them
for admission only because he was not American Indian, Asian, chicano, or
black. The reason for disallowing such direct comparison, moreover,
proceeded from the same baseline explanation: few, if any, of those insulated
from comparison with Bakke might have been deemed more qualified than he,
had direct comparison been made. Since the faculty deemed it unacceptable
for Bakke to be considered more qualified, no such direct comparison was to
take place. In the faculty's view, it would have undermined its affirmative

186. 438 US 265 (1978).
187. Four members of the Court voted to affirm the entire state supreme court judgment for
Bakke and also forbidding the university to consider race or ethnicity in admitting students, under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000a-3 (1988). Four other members would have
reversed the entire judgment rendered in the California Supreme Court, excluding Bakke from being
admitted. Justice Powell alone found that the judgment below was half correct and half incorrect, a
position that thus put him in charge of the actual outcome of the case, pursuant to an opinion in
which he wrote for no one except himself. (For another rare instance of a 4-1-4 vote, in which the
opinion written by the Justice who announced the judgment for the Court also received no
concurring votes, see Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970) (sustaining an act of Congress insofar as it
set the minimum voting age for federal elections at 18, but not sustaining it as applied to eligibility to
vote in state or local elections).) (Oregon v Mitchell is separately notable for another reason; it is the
only Supreme Court case since 1936 holding an act of Congress unconstitutional for lack of
substantive constitutional enacting power, which has not yet been overruled by some other case.)
188. Bakke's science grade-point average ("GPA") was 3.44 and his overall GPA was 3.46. For
1973, the average science GPA of 16 other students was 2.62 and their overall GPA average was 2.88;
for 1974, the second year of Bakke's application, the science and overall GPA average of the new
group of 16 was even lower, respectively, 2.42 and 2.62. The disparities in the four categories of
MCAT scores were still more dramatic: on the verbal component of the MCAT, Bakke was in the
96th percentile, the average for the 16 was in the 46th (1973) and 34th (1974); on the quantitative
component, Bakke was in the 94th percentile, the average of the group was in the 24th (1973) and
30th (1974); on the science component, Bakke was in the 97th percentile, the average of the group
was in the 35th (1973) and 37th (1974). Bakke did least well on the general information component
of the MCAT, placing in the 72nd percentile. But the average of the group was, in respect to the
same general information component of the same MCAT each year far below that (the 33rd
percentile in 1973, the 18th percentile for 1974). These figures are all taken from a table presented
in the Powell opinion in the case. 438 US at 277 n7.
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action plan for Bakke to have been evaluated on the same terms with the other
thirty-two students.
FourJustices concluded that this scheme violated Bakke's federal statutory
right to equal consideration without regard to race, a statutory right
applicable to admission to any program funded in whole in or in part by
federal funds. 18 9 The fifth, critical, vote was cast by Justice Powell. Unlike the
other four Justices, however, Powell rested his decision squarely on the
fourteenth amendment and not on the act of Congress alone. Noting that the
fourteenth amendment applied directly to the Davis medical school (a state
institution), Powell found none of the university's explanations satisfactory to
justify its separate racial dual-track admissions practices as against the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, on that
fourteenth amendment basis, he concurred with the four Justices who
affirmed the judgment Bakke had received in the California Supreme Court.
Allan Bakke's own overall comparative qualifications could not be dismissed
by a racially closed system that put so substantial an admissions premium on
not being white. The fourteenth amendment would not countenance closed
racial reserves. 190
Even so, in Justice Powell's view, to the extent that the medical school
faculty's policy on admissions might rest on a good faith judgment of a
professional sort, reflecting the same kind of academic judgment pursuant to
which a faculty member might determine how most usefully to address a given
subject, or what line of attack to take on a research project, or even which
textbook to use, then some judicial deference might, on that ground, be due.
In elaborating on his suggestion, Justice Powell's usage of "academic
freedom" in the Bakke case was not at all strained; in fact, it was consistent
with the Court's own prior usages of academic freedom.' 9 1 And he developed
his point both strongly and well.
Concretely, Justice Powell suggested, if the ethnicity (or the race) of
candidates for admission were in the faculty's professional opinion relevant
189. USC §§ 2000a-3. (The Act generally forbids racial discrimination in programs assisted by
federal funds.)
190. All applicants were eligible for eighty-four places within the regular admissions process
under the Davis plan. Assuming, however, one were unsuccessful within that nondiscriminatory pool
of applicants, one might nonetheless be eligible for any of sixteen set-aside places, but only if one
qualified by a specified racial trait. Within the latter (racially restricted) pool, one would then be
compared only with others likewise eligible and not with persons like Bakke. The comparative
qualifications of applicants like Bakke would matter only if, once the special, racially restricted
process of admission were concluded, one or more of the sixteen places had still not been filled
(because too few minimally qualified persons had been within that pool in a given year). Then the
other, left-out applicants (such as Bakke) might have some possible second chance. In Powell's view,
this racially exclusionary admissions track could not be justified insofar as it discounted Bakke's
qualifications down to zero vis-a-vis those considered within that track, though Powell did not hold
that race could play no role at all. In the latter respect, he differed from the four Justices who ruled
strictly on the basis of Title VI. His reasons for differing, bearing on academic freedom as they do,
are provided in the text. See notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
191. The phrase is employed three times in the Powell opinion; the most relevant discussion
appears at 438 US at 311-15, citing and relying on Sweezy and Keyishian as the judicial precedents
most forcefully on point.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 3

simply in the same manner as, say, their place of residence or their difference
in undergraduate academic major-as attributes relevant to consider in the
dehomogenization of what would otherwise constitute an unduly "look-alike,
think-alike" cohort of first-year medical students-its consideration might not
be excluded from the admissions process. Indeed, in Powell's view, its unique
exclusion as having no constitutionally permissible relevance for academic
admission would unnecessarily frustrate a good faith professional resolve to
construct a learning, teaching, and research environment in which useful
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit are expected to occur. 19 2 Finding no absolute
fourteenth amendment requirement for its nonconsideration for any purpose
whatever, Powell voted to reverse that portion of the state supreme court's
judgment that held that race must be ignored by any public or publicly
supported university. Because, on the other hand, Bakke never received any
consideration in respect to his comparative attributes, talents, skills, and
background vis-i-vis those who were favored by the Davis racial set-aside
plan, Justice Powell also voted to affirm that part of the judgment holding that
Bakke had been unfairly excluded from such opportunity for comparative
consideration. 193 A proper program "treats each applicant as an individual,"
consistent with the equal protection clause, Powell insisted, even when it
allows proper institutional academic freedom judgments to be given
breathing room on their own account:
[An integrated program] treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions
process. [Within such an integrated program, tihe applicant who loses out on the last
available seat to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic
background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that
his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did
not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been
weighed fairly and competitively, and he would 9 have
no basis to complain of unequal
4
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1

192. The argument is similar to (but more carefully developed than) that submitted by the AAUP
in its amicus brief in the case, which is summarized as follows:
Many institutions of higher education, especially graduate and professional schools, receive
more applications from candidates who are qualified, i.e., able to successfully complete the
course of study, than the institution can admit. [Under these circumstances] an institution
may validly conclude that the quality of the educational experience for all students is
enhanced by considering as one factor in the admission process the racial diversity of the
class selected. Accordingly, the AAUP will suggest that a faculty, in exercising its
experienced judgment, may identify a nontrivial number of qualified minority students for
admission to assure the optimal educational experience for the entire class selected.
AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Regents of the University of Californiav Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978)
(No 76-811).
193. Since, moreover, the university was unable to show that Bakke would have failed of
admission even had he not been disqualified from comparison with all sixteen of the favored students
both in 1973 and in 1974, pursuant to a proper integrated admissions program (which in Powell's
view the Davis plan clearly was not), the state court judgment enjoining the school from refusing to
enroll him was entirely proper in Justice Powell's view of the case. Accordingly, he voted to affirm
this part of what the state supreme court had done. In brief, Bakke prevailed individually and the
plan was enjoined.
194. Bakke, 438 US at 318.
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That the point was a serious point, and not a specious or lightly conceived
suggestion, was attested by the strong footnote he added:
The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without
regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program.
Nowhere in the opinion of [the
four justices voting to sustain the program as it was] is
19 5
this denial even addressed.

Powell's use of "academic freedom" in Bakke, and his quotation of the
dictum by Justice Frankfurter from the Sweezy case, 196 represent no departure
from the usages of academic freedom we have examined. When Powell writes
of academic freedom as "long . ..viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment," 19 7 his emphasis remains constant at all times. To gain

purchase through the first amendment, the decision in any academic freedom
case, whether individual or institutional, must still rest-as Frankfurter
noted-on academic and not on some other grounds. It is all the same,
moreover, whether the decision pertains to "who may be admitted to study"
rather than to "who may teach," or "what may be taught," or "how."
So, for instance, suppose the selection of a given textbook were made by a
given teacher or university professor because of a desire to befriend the
particular publisher whose text one concedes to be poorer than that provided
by other publishers, but whom one nonetheless felt a passionate desire to
befriend.198 This is not a selection made on academic grounds. Accordingly,
it should receive no first amendment academic freedom deference. Rather,
one will need a reason of a different sort to defend a given textbook
selection 199 on academic freedom grounds, for example, that one believes the
text is superior in some respect over alternative choices (whether or not
others agree), or that its presentation is more lucid than that of alternative
books (again, whether or not others agree), or, though not necessarily
"better" in either of these respects abstractly, its perspective is more
illuminating and best fits one's design for the course. Implicitly, Powell is
saying all the same things in Bakke. He voted to reverse that part of the state
court judgment disallowing any consideration of race in state university
admissions practices; he did so on limited first amendment, academic freedom
grounds. In limiting the decision, and in tightly circumscribing the
university's procedures, he also sought to take due account of Bakke's equal
195. Id at 318 n52.
196. " 'It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential
freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.' " Id at 312, quoting Sweezy, 354
US at 263 (emphasis added) (see note 101 and accompanying text).
197. Bakke, 438 US at 312.
198. Perhaps because the publisher had opposed the war in Vietnam and the faculty, or a majority
of the faculty, also opposed the war in Vietnam. Perhaps because the publisher had contributed
money to a prolife organization or, conversely, to Planned Parenthood, and, again, the faculty also
favored that social cause. Perhaps because the author is one's nephew-or niece. The range of
nonprofessional (and also of unprofessional) reasons is nearly inexhaustible.
199. -Whether the defense (that is, the explanation) one means to provide is to the institution,
to one's students, or, indeed, to the author or publisher of an alternative book.
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protection claims. Whether one thinks the opinion ultimately correct or not,
the Powell opinion in Bakke remains to this day one of the most well-disposed
treatments of "academic freedom" one can find in the cases that have
adverted to that freedom in the Supreme Court.
C.

(1979-1989)

In the first of the dozen cases reporting a usage of "academic freedom" in
the most recent decade of Supreme Court adjudications, Cannon v. University of
Chicago,20 0 the reference to academic freedom also appears in an opinion by
Justice Powell. In marked contrast to Bakke, however, Cannon presented no
constitutional issue. Rather, the case turned on differences of attitude toward
academic freedom in matters of statutory construction and the extent to which
concerns for academic freedom may influence the interpretation of a law.
In enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Congress
provided that no person could on the basis of sex be "subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."-2 0 ' The act provided expressly for agency enforcement
of this provision.

It did not, however, create private causes of action.

Nonetheless, a majority of the Court held that such actions, though not given
explicit congressional authorization, would be deemed authorized by Title IX.
It was on this point that the case had gone to the Supreme Court.
In dissent, Justice White took issue with the majority. In his view,
Congress had deliberately chosen not to provide for such private suits but
only to require that recipient institutions answer to the appropriate disbursing
agency. 20 2 Justices Blackmun and Powell joined in Justice White's dissent.
Justice Powell, however, wrote an additional thirty-page dissent to underscore
the extent of his disagreement with the majority's view, and his dissent
expressed concern for academic freedom. 20 3 In Powell's view, insofar as
universities would now need not only to satisfy government agencies of their
compliance with the act (as Congress had intended) but would need also to
take care not to invite private suits, they would be under duress to alter
standards, not because the standards were inappropriate, but simply in order
to forestall such suits. To be sure, Powell did not doubt Congress's power to
authorize such suits. However, absent a clear expression from Congress, the
Court itself ought not "revise the balance of interests struck by the
legislation.- 20 4 To do so was to ignore the costs to academic freedom, for
example, by hindering a university's ability to set academic standards in good
professional faith, uncompromised by an additional anxiety of threatening
suits.

20 5

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
Stevens

441 US 677 (1979).
20 USC § 1681(a) (1988); see generally 20 USC §§ 1681 to 1683 (1988).
Cannon, 441 US at 718 (White dissenting).
Id at 730 (Powell dissenting).
Id at 748 n19.
May fear of private suits adversely affect one's decisions on the merits of things? Justice
briefly considered and dismissed this concern as "speculation." Id at 709. Compare the
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Powell's concern for academic freedom in Cannon was of a piece with
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.20 6 An individual

teacher (as in Sweezy) or an institution (as in Cannon) can be substantially
compromised at the margin of professional judgment when the alternative is
to risk an encounter with a very high-voltage fence. If one's sole concern is
that the fence stimulate a suitably strong aversive reflex, of course, one will
not mind; indeed, one may be inclined to say, "the higher the voltage, the
better this fence!"

In Powell's view, this was pretty much the majority's

approach in Cannon.20 7 But, for Powell, it is just this reasoning that also made
the decision even more obviously incorrect. The higher the voltage, the
greater the fear and so the greater the loss of the margin of the useful field
now newly abandoned nearby the fence. The majority of the Court might see
that loss as of little consequence. But so to suppose, and so to decide the case

absent a clear congressional requirement to do so was in a larger sense
seriously inconsistent with the Court's own prior decisions since 1957.
Unavailing in Cannon, Powell's opinion was nevertheless well within the
tradition Frankfurter marked out beginning with Sweezy, and influential with
the Court in cases such as Keyishian and Bakke as well.
In contrast with Cannon, the issue in Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing 2° 8 concerned the substantive due process claim of a student dropped in

his sixth year from the University of Michigan Medical School and refused
readmission on academic grounds after failing a major written examinationa two-day test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners,

successful completion of which was required to receive his degree. The
student, Scott Ewing, did not dispute the requirement of the examination nor
the requirement of its successful completion to secure a degree. He did not

deny that he had failed to achieve the university's minimum passing score for
the test. But he observed that others who had failed the same examination
general reflections of Judge Learned Hand: "After now some dozen years of experience I must say
that ... I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." Learned
Hand, 3 Lectures on Legal Topics, Association of the Bar of the City of New York 106 (Macmillan, 1926).
Academics, like others, may do a great deal to avoid sickness or death, nor are they known to be
braver than Learned Hand in fearing a lawsuit.
206. Indeed, in his discussion of academic freedom, Powell explicitly drew from and relied upon
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy. 441 US at 747-48, citing Frankfurter in Sweezy, 354 US 234; see also
text accompanying notes 94-101.
207. Ten years after Cannon, in University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, I I S Ct 577 (1990), the Court
also rejected any claim of qualified confidentiality of tenure review files under subpoena demand of
the EEOC. The AAUP filed an amicus brief endorsing a qualified privilege, akin to that generally
recognized when grand juries subpoena a reporter's notes, and relying on Sweezy. AAUP's Brief as
Amicus Curiae, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577(1990) (No 88-493). Two federal
courts of appeal had agreed (although two others had not), and each had directed federal district
courts to review EEOC subpoenas of academic tenure review files of confidential peer review
materials by standards of scrutiny derived from Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy. Purporting to
distinguish Sweezy on the basis that the inquiry in that case went to the content of teaching, whereas
here it went to the determination of professional qualification (though why that difference should be
thought to matter is nowhere explained), the Court rejected the claim. University of Pennsylvania, 110
S Ct at 585-87. The tenor and decision in University of Pennsylvania are more at odds with Sweezy than
any other single case to come from the Supreme Court during the past thirty-five years.
208. 474 US 214 (1985).
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had been permitted to retake the examination rather than being dropped.
Indeed, it appeared that he was the first student ever to be dropped rather
than being permitted to try again. To be sure, his scores were the lowest in
the history of the program, and the medical school had provided a hearing
that reviewed his whole academic career and not simply his examination
score. (From any point of view, therefore, procedural due process was easily
satisfied in the medical school's handling of his case.209 ) But in Ewing's
view-and in the view of the federal court of appeals that reviewed the trial
record of the case in the district court-there was nothing in the record that
provided any reasonable basis for the apparent harshness of discontinuing
Ewing's medical school career. On that basis, the court of appeals had
210
reversed the district court's dismissal of his case.
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with this disposition. In
respect to substantive academic judgments within universities, the Court
declared:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision
...they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment .... Added to our concern for lack of
standards (there are none obviously provided by the Constitution or elsewhere
according to which judges or juries can say what norms of academic competence are
suitable or unsuitable for any university as such) is a reluctance to trench on the
prerogatives of... educational institutions and our responsibility
to safeguard their
''
"1men1t.
academic freedom, "a special concern of the First Amen

Only where the faculty can be shown to have abdicated its responsibility to
make judgments on academic grounds (that is, only when it does "not actually
exercise professional judgment") does it forfeit the protection the first
amendment provides. 2t 2 Ewing, with Keyishian, Frankfurter's opinion in
209. Whether the school might have been faulted had it not provided such a hearing incident to a
student's dismissal for academic (rather than disciplinary) reasons was thus not at issue in Ewing. In
all likelihood, however, no particular kind of intramural review of the kind provided Scott Ewing
would be held to be required as a matter of constitutional right. (In an earlier case, the Supreme
Court expressed substantial reservations on the point. See Board of Curators, University of Missouri v
Horowitz, 435 US 78 (1978).) Where, in contrast, a student's standing in a public university is put in
jeopardy because of an infraction of the rules (such as stealing, harassment, drinking, plagiarism, or
campus disruption), predecisional intramural procedural due process is much more likely to be
deemed constitutionally required. See, for example, Dixon v Alabama State Board of Educ., 294 F2d 150
(5th Cir 1961).
210. In conventional 14th amendment constitutional terms, Ewing's complaint was one of
substantive due process, that is, the alleged lack of any sufficient substantive reason for depriving him
of his "property" interest in his status as a student in good standing in a state university. Of course,
the case may also be seen as one affecting a student's substantive academic freedom in the same
sense as discussed in Baggett v Bullitt, 377 US 360, that is, the continuing freedom of one within the
university to continue to study, to learn, and to interact with the faculty, assuming satisfactory work
as determined in good professional faith. See, for example, 1967 Statement at 142; Appendix C, 53
L & Contemp Probs at 412 (cited in note 7) ("Student performance should be evaluated solely on an
academic basis, not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards.").
211. Ewing, 474 US at 225-26. The standard adopted and applied by the Court in Ewing was put
forward in virtually the same terms in the amicus brief of the AAUP. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae,
Regents of University of Michigan v Ewing, 474 US 214 (1985) (No 84-1273).
212. See also justice Powell's strongly supportive view adopting essentially the same standard on
matters of evaluating persons for appointment or tenure, in Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 US 69, 80
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Sweezy, and Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, is among the Court's strongest

first amendment-based decisions articulating the meaning of academic
freedom in higher education.
With two exceptions, both addressed to the scope of academic freedom in
public secondary education, the balance of decisions reporting a usage of
"academic freedom" in the Supreme Court during this most recent decade

are but slight refinements on earlier themes.
Such a refinement is furnished by Widmar v. Vincent,2 13 decided by the

Court in 1981. Widmar provided a reprise on Healy v. James2 14 and raised anew
the scope of constitutional protection afforded student groups on public
university campuses. Unlike Healy, however, Widmar did not involve a refusal

to "recognize" a particular student organization, such as a refusal to permit it
to meet on campus, post notices, solicit members, and have the same oncampus privileges as any other student organization could claim. At issue,

rather, was a board of curators rule forbidding a particular use of university
buildings or university grounds regardless of what group might be involved.
The use of such buildings or grounds for "religious worship or religious
teaching" was forbidden, and the board of curators believed this restriction
was required by a clause of the Missouri Constitution.2

student

organization

of evangelical

Christian

15

students

Cornerstone, a

from

various

denominational backgrounds at the University of Missouri at Kansas City,
found itself altogether frustrated by this use restriction. Effectively, the
restriction denied them any use of university buildings for the very sort of
21 6
meetings and activities they were most committed to provide as a group.
Lacking any other recourse against the rule, Clark Vincent and other student
n4 (1983) ("Courts of Appeals generally have acknowledged that respect for academic freedom
requires some deference to the judgment of schools and universities as to the qualifications of
professors, particularly those considered for tenured positions."). See generally Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 L & Contemp Probs 155 (Summer 1990).
213. 454 US 263 (1981).
214. 408 US 169.
41idmar, 454 US at 263. The Missouri constitutional provision was worded similarly to, but
215.
somewhat more far-reachingly than, the provision in the first amendment that forbids any act of
Congress "respecting an establishment of religion." Mo Const, Art I §§ 6, 7; Art IX § 8. In
McCollum v Board of Educ., 333 US 203 (1948), the Supreme Court had held that this clause in the first
amendment was equally applicable to the states through the 14th amendment and was violated by a
religious "released-time program" in a public school, which co-ordinated religious instruction by
religious teachers using school classrooms during the regular school hours. (The fact that students
were nominally not compelled to attend, but might instead remain in a regular classroom while the
released-time religious classes met, was held to be of insufficient significance.) Compare Zorach v
Clauson, 343 US 306 (1952) (similar plan sustained, five-to-four, when the released students met
religious classes off school premises, even if those not opting into the program were kept in a study
hall at the public school). In Widmar. even supposing that the 14th amendment might not bar a state
university from permitting sectarian religious activities on campus when sponsored by a student
group permitted use of campus facilities on the same terms as every other student group, the board
of curators believed that the Missouri Constitution nonetheless forbade such use of public facilities.
454 US at 265.
216. "A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion
of religious views and experiences." Id at 265 n2. The meetings were also generally open to other
students to attend, part of the purpose being to win adherents to Cornerstone's religious
commitments. Id.
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members of Cornerstone sued to enjoin Gary Widmar (the dean of students)
and the university's board of curators from enforcing the rule against them.
In the Supreme Court, as well as in the court of appeals, their claim prevailed
on first amendment grounds. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Widmar,
said that even supposing that Cornerstone sought "to win ...

converts" 2 1 7 in

its meetings on campus (as well as to realize its members' shared religious
enthusiasms), the point provided no sensible distinction from what the Court
had already decided in Healy and Tinker. Common rules of time, place, and
manner governing on-campus facilities, consistent with standards reviewed in
Healy, would apply to Cornerstone as to any other on-campus group, 21 8 but
not a content-censoring restriction, which, in the Court's view, the curator's
rule, even if adopted under requirement of the state Constitution, obviously
was. Widmar, moreover, is not reasoned on the basis of the free exercise
clause but on more generalized freedom of speech principles. Widmar is thus
of a piece with the strong holding in Tinker, Powell's holding in Healy, and
21 9
Justice Douglas' opinion in Jones v. Board of Education.
A concurring opinion in Widmar by Justice Stevens 22 0 makes a point not in
disagreement with Powell's majority opinion, but qualifying it in a manner
anticipating his own applied usage of "academic freedom" in Ewing. Stevens
expressly referred to "academic freedom" to disallow intrusive judicial review
of institutional procedures for handling disputes in allocating university
space. In Stevens' view, the first amendment may shelter on-campus free
speech and meeting rights of students at public institutions. Even so, he
insisted, where such groups seek use of facilities, the first amendment does
not require suspension of institutional opinion respecting their relative
academic worthiness-at least in mediating competing demands, if not in
judging their general "right" to be on campus. Rather, the first amendment
specifically protects academic value judgments reflected in institutional
mechanisms established to determine priorities of use where not all requests
can simultaneously be granted. In Stevens' view, institutional discretion of
this sort is not different in kind than the sort Powell embraced for the Court in
the Bakke case. It is correspondingly entitled to a strong measure of academic
freedom respect in the courts.
Stevens offered an example: suppose one group requests use of a room to
show Disney films, and another requests its use to present Hamlet. Must the
conflict be resolved by, say, flipping a coin or by some other equally
217. Id at 269-70 n6.
218. See id at 276. An additional cautionary note is sounded in regard to student activities
otherwise protected by the first amendment when conducted in ways that "substantially interfere
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id at 277. But allowable regulations
of this sort are themselves merely an example of uniform rules of time, place, and manner (for
example, rules suitably drawn to avoid harassment of others by regulating the time, place, and
manner of holding one's meetings or otherwise seeking to win support for one's general views), and
not a ban based on the unwelcomeness of certain ideas.
219. Jones, 397 US 31. See also 1967 Statement at Part IV; Appendix C, 53 L & Contemp Probs at
413-15 (cited in note 7).
220. 454 US 277, 278-80.
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impersonal mechanism, lest some other basis be thought to infringe on the
first amendment claims of both groups? Stevens suggests not. If the decision
is to prefer Disney to Hamlet (Stevens uses this contrast deliberately), and for
the reason that Hamlet is already well covered in standard courses whereas
"the genius of Walt Disney" has not previously been given any airing at all,

then, though the decision is made on this basis of comparative academic
worth rather than some other more "neutral" basis (for example, as to who
applied first), the first amendment shifts its center of gravity to protect the

decision from intrusive judicial review. 22 '

In this respect, the usage of

"academic freedom" reflected in Stevens' concurrence in Widmar is of a piece
2 22
with the position he reflected in Ewing as well.

In a case arising between Widmar and Ewing, involving faculty rather than
students,2 2 3 a different usage of "academic freedom" appears. A Minnesota
law imposed an obligation on the state board governing the state community
college system to "meet and confer" from time to time with faculty on matters
of educational policy. It imposed a similar obligation equally on the
administration of each college. At the same time, however, the same law also
forbade either the state board or any community college administration to
permit any faculty member to appear in such meetings other than as a
designee of whatever professional association (that is, union) had gained
exclusive 'representation rights for collective bargaining purposes, even
though these meetings were in no sense collective bargaining sessions but
were meant to address other kinds of issues. The effect of the law, combined
with the practice of the faculty union, was altogether to exclude nonunion
221. See id at 278-79 (Stevens concurring) ("Judgments of this kind should be made by
academicians, not by federal judges .... "), citing Sweezy, 354 US at 261 (Frankfurter concurring), and
Bakke, 438 US at 312, and repeating the quotation that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment." 454 US at 279.
222. Yet despite Justice Stevens' insightful and supportive endorsement of academic freedom in
this usage, that is, protecting such allocative decisions from judicial review, one may doubt that the
analogy to Bakke or Ewing properly holds in cases of this sort. Why? Because in respect to these
groups, each involving no institutional endorsement or sponsorship (Widmar and Cornerstone is an
example), their presence on campus owes nothing to judgments of academic connection;
accordingly, neither should their requests about times and places to meet. Consider a case similar to
that which Justice Stevens proposed. Suppose it is not a case where a student group rehearsal of
Hamlet (for its own amusement) competes for reservation of an unused room with a student group
request to reserve the same room to view Disney films (for its own amusement). Rather, a
reservation request by the Federalist Society is followed later the same day by a competing request
for the same room at the same time by the Student Gay-Lesbian Alliance. On Justice Stevens' view,
the latter request, though second-arriving, may be given priority if done on the basis of an academic
(rather than a political) judgment. What would such a judgment consist of? Presumably it might be
merely a judgment ofjust the kind Stevens used: federalism perspectives are already well covered in
the standard curriculum, whereas gay-lesbian perspectives have not been equally featured. From the
decision-maker's position, this may seem reasonable enough. From the perspective of the rejected
group, however, it seems supererogatory (as well as suspect). Losing the room on such grounds to
some university event or university sponsored activity is one thing. Losing it to another group no
different from itself (in that it is equally an unsponsored group and, like this group, merely pursuing
its own agenda on campus) on some notion of superior academic timeliness about the other group's
agenda, is another. It puts the university's thumb on a scale where arguably it does not belong at all.
223. Vinnesota State Board for Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271 (1984).
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faculty members who wished also to be heard on matters of educational policy
(for example, what should be taught). Such faculty might still attempt to
communicate their views informally-by writing personal letters 22 4-but they
were barred from speaking in the only formally required regular meetings.
Several of the adversely affected faculty sued to enjoin this restriction on first
amendment grounds. The federal district court held that this restriction,
running as it did to these overall "meet and confer" meetings and not more
narrowly (for example, to specific collective bargaining negotiations alone),
unfairly curtailed the first amendment academic freedom of those faculty
members not electing to be union members to be heard on matters of equal
professional concern to them as academics. 22 5 However, the Supreme Court
reversed, albeit in a closely divided vote.
Writing for the Court over a dissent by Justices Powell, Stevens, and
Brennan, and a partial dissent by Justice Marshall, Justice O'Connor put the
decision reversing the lower court principally on the basis that, had there
been no state law requiring such meet and confer sessions, plaintiffs could not
have compelled the holding of such meetings. This being so, in her view, they
had no better basis for complaint here. Insofar as the state wished to provide
for such meetings by way of an extended opportunity for the union to
communicate its concerns on general matters (leaving others to the informal
recourse they already enjoyed), there could be no sensible constitutional
objection. Going beyond the needs of the immediate case, however,
O'Connor also added the following passages, at once both clear and bleak in
rejecting an entire category of professional academic freedom first
amendment claims:
To be sure, there is a strong, if not universal or uniform, tradition of faculty
participation in school governance, and there are numerous policy arguments to
support such participation. See American Association of Higher Education-National
Education Association, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance (1967); Brief for
American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae 3-10. But this Court
has never recognized a constitutional right of faculty to participate in policymaking in
academic institutions .... Even assuming that speech rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment take on a special meaning in an academic 22setting
. . . there is no
6
constitutional right to participate in academic governance.

Though concurring in the particular judgment in the case, Justice Marshall
expressly disassociated himself from this part of the Court's majority
opinion. 2 2 7 Writing separately in dissent, Brennan explained for himself,
224.

Id at 277 n4.

225.

Knight v Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F Supp 1, 7-12 (D Minn 1982). In an

amicus brief, the AAUP agreed with this view. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271 (1984) (Nos 82-898 and 82-977). See also Madison joint
School Dist. v Wisconsin Employment Relations Commn, 429 US 167 (1976) (holding that a state law
effectively forbidding a nonunion teacher to address an elected school board in a general meeting of
the school board open to the public, without the union's permission to do so, violated the silenced
teacher's personal first amendment rights; AAUP amicus brief supporting the claim on first
amendment-academic freedom grounds).
226. Knight, 465 US at 287-88.
227. Id at 293 (Marshall concurring) ("Such participation is . . . essential if our academic
institutions are to fulfill their dual responsibility to advance the frontiers of knowledge through
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"why, irrespective of other grounds, principles of academic freedom require
affirmance of the District Court's holding," 2 28 namely that in his view:
[The flirst amendment freedom to explore novel or controversial ideas in the
classroom is closely linked to the freedom of faculty members to express their views to

The freedom to
the administration concerning matters of academic governance ....
teach without inhibition may be jeopardized just as gravely by a restriction on the
faculty's ability to speak out on such matters as by the more direct restrictions struck
down in Keyishian and in Epperson. In my view, therefore, a direct prohibition of some
identified faculty group from submitting their views concerning academic policy
violate the
questions for consideration by college administrators would plainly
2 29
principles of academic freedom enshrined in the First Amendment.

An additional dissent separately added by Stevens (and joined by Justices
Brennan and Powell) strongly endorsed Brennan's perspective. As a
consequence, the contrast within the Supreme Court in Knight could not have
been more pronounced. The majority saw the case as simply a matter of
meetings that need not have been provided for in any event, and insofar as
they were provided they furnished an opportunity for substantial faculty
representation albeit limited to designees of the faculty's own professional
group. The dissent viewed the same statute, however, as working a serious
and unwarranted restriction on some faculty members' opportunities to be
heard on matters of academic substance as part and parcel of their own
academic freedom, disadvantaging them solely on the basis of their individual
decisions not to become union members although still obliged to pay full
dues. Unaffected by the Court's decision in Knight are such meetings as are
required to be held for general public purposes. 2 30 Unaffected, too, may be
the assurance that faculty submitting professional concerns through
correspondence and other channels may still claim a strong measure of first
amendment academic freedom protection. Still, the majority's dicta as well as
its holding in Knight significantly diminish a university faculty because of the
distinctly managerial view of academic institutions to which the O'Connor
opinion strongly yields. Among decisions of the past decade, Knight is one of
two 2 3 1 that have leaned against the course Justice Frankfurter originally set

for the Court in Sweezy, three decades ago.
Knight is nonetheless also a useful transitional case in moving to the last
three decisions completing this unhurried review of usages of academic
freedom and the first amendment in the Supreme Court. What makes it so is
the character of the colleges engaged in the litigation. Knight concerned twoyear community colleges, which are not quite four-year public baccalaureate
degree institutions nor advanced degree research universities on the one
hand, nor public primary or secondary schools on the other. We have not
unfettered inquiry and debate . . . and to produce a citizenry willing and able to involve itself in the
governance of the polity.)
(citation omitted).
228. Id at 295 (Brennan dissenting).

229.

Id at 296-97.

230.
231.

See .\ladisonJoint School Dist.. 429 US 167.
The other is Universit , of PennsYlvania, 110 S Ct 577.
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hitherto noticed a great deal turning on such matters, 23 2 but the distinction
2
becomes more important as our review nears its end.

33

Some of "the functions of educational institutions in our national life" to
2 34 are of a
which Justice Frankfurter made reference in Wieman v. Updegraff
sort more easily associated with universities than with public schools, for
example, functions of critical scholarship and research. The tasks of primary
and secondary schools are at once much more mixed and substantially more
instrumental than those of colleges or universities. The age of the student,
the requirement of attendance, the standardization of teacher credentialing,
the structured inculcation of basic skills, and other factors describe a very
different milieu. The importance of these schools is not diminished by these
observations. Far from it.235 They nonetheless serve in a cautionary fashion,
distancing the environment of public schools from universities. Academic
freedom plays out somewhat differently in the milieu of primary and
secondary public education. 2 36 It is drawn in principally as a constitutional
check against state tendencies to misuse powers of educational command to
censor materials or instruction, but it plays out much more ambiguously and
without the same breadth of reach.
An example of the difference is offered by the 1982 decision of the
Supreme Court in Board of Education v Pico 2 37 The case arose after a local
232. For example, although Sweezy involved a state university (rather than a community college or
a local public school), the strong statement by Frankfurter emphasized "the nature of the teacher's
role" and the importance of disallowing "unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers"
(that is, it was not limited to "professors" or to those with doctorates). Moreover, several of the
more significant cases were public school rather than higher education cases (for example, Adler
(disqualification from public school teaching of persons with certain political affiliations), Pickering
(public expression by teachers), Scopes (public school course content restrictions) and Epperson
(same)).
233. See, for example, DiBona v Matthews, 220 Cal App 3d 1329, 269 Cal Rptr 882 (1990), cert
denied, 59 USLW 3402 (1990) (community college administration's cancellation of drama class held
to violate first amendment, suit brought by the drama instructor and an enrolled student; court
rejected the comparison of community college with high schools in measuring the protected range of
drama instructor's professional discretion to determine course content, locating it more closely in
keeping with the fuller range of academic freedom in colleges (than in high schools) and noting:
"Defendants have cited no authority-and we are aware of none-which would allow a college or
university to censor instructor-selected curriculum materials because they contain 'indecent'
language or deal with 'offensive' topics." Id at 1346-47, 269 Cal Rptr at 893).
234. 344 US at 197; see notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
235. Indeed, it is primary and secondary education (not universities) that was the immediate
reference of the Warren Court when it noted: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." The
quotation is, of course, from Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483, 493 (1954).
236. In West Virginia State Board of Educ. v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), the Supreme Court struck
down a state law requiring public school children to participate in daily pledges of allegiance to the
American flag. It did so on the ground that such compulsory expression of political belief under
state direction was inconsistent with the broad protection afforded by the first amendment from
forced recitation of political beliefs one may not share, and that even grade school children may
constitutionally resist such exercises despite the ambitions of the state (including a democratic state)
to inculcate patriotism by this means. Id at 634-42. Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter
dissented. Id at 646. Plainly, his views on the "functions" of public schools, and his views of the
"functions" of universities, were not all the same. For a recent thoughtful review of such matters
more generally, see Am) Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton Univ Press, 1987).
237. Board of Educ.. Island Trees v Pico, 457 US 853 (1982).
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elected school board in Island Trees, New York, ordered the removal of nine
specified books from all high school and junior high school libraries in the
district. Suit was brought in federal district court on behalf of several
students. On first amendment grounds they sought an injunction against the
school board's removal decree insofar as it affected the libraries at the schools
in which they were enrolled. But the constitutional basis for their suit was far
from compelling. 23 8 Some of the books were seriously controversial; their
suitability for youngsters (in comparison with university students 23 9 or
community college students) was by no means obvious. Nor could it easily be
argued that, even so, they might well serve to cultivate values of tolerance and
a mutual appreciation of positive differences in a free democratic societythemes the Court had stressed as consistent with the proper educational
function of public schools. To the contrary, the books might be thought to
convey destructive images and crude, offensive stereotypes. 240 To be sure,
the first amendment might well not permit a general ban on the availability of
such books to minors merely on that account, but no restriction on what these
students could buy, read at home, or borrow from a public library was
involved here. Nonetheless, the students prevailed, at least partially. On first

238. Since only students were suing (no teacher, librarian, book publisher, or author claimed
ground for relief), the case shaped up quite unpromisingly, as a claim asserted by public school
students to have their first amendment view of material suitable for a school library prevail in
opposition to the view of the school board of the district in which they resided. Viewed this way, the
case seemed weak. The district court granted summary judgment to the school board. 474 F Supp
387 (ED NY 1979). Fortunately for the plaintiffs, however, the board had acted against
recommendations of its own appointed parent-teacher book review committee in respect to seven of
the nine books it ordered removed. In rejecting the committee's recommendations, moreover, the
board had declined even to say why. Portions of the plurality opinion for the Supreme Court
substantially relied on these facts in determining what deference was due the judgment of the school
board. 457 U.S. at 874-75. Additionally, as the case proceeded in the courts, the action seeking
reinstatement, or reshelving, of the books was strongly supported in amicus briefs filed on behalf of
the National Education Association, the American Library Association, the Authors League of
America, and P.E.N. American Center. See id at 855. So the actual array of interested parties in
securing first amendment limits on school library book-removal practices by politicized school
boards was in fact very substantial, putting the case in a stronger light.
239. A critical first amendment distinction of this kind is made in the dissent illustrating the
constitutional difference (of role and function) members of the Court tend to attribute to universities
as distinct from public schools. See id at 915 (Rehnquist dissenting) (expressly distinguishing
universities from public schools in just this way). See also note 236 (views of'Justice Frankfurter on
the same point).
240. By way of example, Justice Powell provided seven pages of excerpts from some of the books
as an Appendix to his dissent, 457 US at 897-904. They included such passages as these: "There are
white men who will pay you to fuck their wives. They approach you and say, 'How would you like to
fuck a white woman?' 'What is this?' you ask. 'On the up-and-up,' he assures you. 'It's all right.
She's my wife. She needs black rod, is all. She has to have it. It's like a medicine or drug to her. I'll
pay you.' " Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (quoted at id at 897); "What do you think goes on in the
wagon at night: Are the drivers on their kneesfucking their mothers?. . . . 'Who else would do anything
like that but a mother-fucking Zhid?' . . . . 'No more noise out of you or I'll shoot your Jew cock off.'
• . . 'You cocksucker Zhid, I ought to make you lick it up off the floor.' " Bernard Malmud, The Fixer
(id at 898-99); " 'I wonder if sex without acid could be so exciting, so wonderful, so indescribable.'
If I don't give Big Ass a blow he'll cut off my supply.'"
. .* 'Another day, another blow job ....
Anonymous, Go Ask Alice (id at 899).
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amendment grounds, albeit on a close five-to-four vote, 2 4 1 the Court granted
them an opportunity to put the school board's actions on trial in federal
district court, with a fair possibility of getting some of the books put back.
The success of the case essentially turned on evidence in the record that at
least some of the books 24 2 had been removed because of a desire to suppress
information and perspectives reflected in these books not supportive of
political and social doctrines the board members and their most active
constituents sought personally to advance through their control of public
schools. Removal of the books from all of the district's public school libraries
may have been ordered, in short, " 'not in the interests of the children's wellbeing' " but rather for the purpose of establishing those political views " 'as
the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the particular
community.' ",243 The strategy was to "contract the spectrum of available
knowledge ' 244 by banning books presenting views other than those the board
members wanted to prevail in the larger community. 2 4 5 There being evidence

of this design in the record of the case, then, as the court of appeals had held,
the plaintiffs " 'should have . . . been offered an opportunity to persuade a

241. The case utterly divided the Supreme Court, producing seven separate opinions, and a
majority on no opinion. Id at 899. See the description provided in the Supreme Court Reporter's
remarkable headnote to the case:
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which
MARSHALL and STEVENS,JJ., joined and in all but Part I1-A(l) of which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 875. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 883.
BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 8 85. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 8 9 3 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, J.,
joined, post, p. 9 0 4. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 92 !.
Id at 854-55.
242. Among the nine books targeted for removal from the high school library were Kurt
Vonnegut, Jr.'s Slaughterhouse-Five, Desmond Morris's The Naked Ape, and Langston Hughes, ed, Best
Short Stories of NVegro lriters. Id at 856 n3. All have figured prominently in public school bookbanning litigation. See, for example, Parducci v Rutland, 316 F Supp 352 (MD Ala 1970) (reinstating a
high school 11 th grade English teacher after dismissal for insubordination in refusing to discontinue
use of Vonnegut's Welcome to the Monkev House). This case is especially noteworthy insofar as the
federal judge, Frank Johnson, wrote explicitly that the teacher's professional interest was that of
"academic freedom," as a first amendment-protected freedom, and held that the action of the school
principal and school board "constituted an unwarranted invasion of her First Amendment right to
academic freedom." Id at 356.
243. Pico, 457 US at 860-61 n16, quoting opinion ofJudge Sifton, 638 F2d 404, 417 (2d Cir 1980)
(reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the board). By way of example, the Court
quoted from statements made by several board members such as this: " 'I am basically a conservative
in my general philosophy ....
I feel that it is my duty to apply my conservative principles to the decision[s]...
in which I am involved as a board member and I have done so with regard to... curriculum formation and content
and other educational matters.' " Id at 872-73 n24 (emphasis added). A deposition of another board
member acknowledged that he voted to remove one of the books because of its "anti-Americanism,"
such as the failure of the book to omit mention that George Washington was a slaveholder. Id at 873
n25. "That [including mention that Washington did own slaves] is one example of what I would
consider anti-American," the board member said. Id.
244. Id at 866, quoting Justice Douglas in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 482 (1965).
245. See discussion and examples in notes 240, 243.

Page 79: Summer 1990]

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

149

finder of fact that the ostensible justifications for [the school board's] actions
...were simply pretexts.' "246
Pico was, by any fair judgment, an important first amendment (and
academic freedom 24 7) decision, albeit perhaps less so for the decision it
reached than for the decision itavoided. Decided on the grounds identified
by the Court, it stands for an orthodox general first amendment principle, in
no way peculiar to public education: public agencies, local school boards not
excepted, may not attempt to "contract the spectrum of available knowledge"
when the object to be served is to try to restrict freedom of information just
because the information is of a kind others might draw upon to question or to
dissent from the views that that public agency 248 thinks it best for the public,
or some subset of the public, to entertain. Understood this way, there is really
nothing extraordinary here. Justice Robert Jackson put the basic relevant
proposition quite well half a century ago, and probably no one has much
improved upon it since:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
24 9
platitudes.

Indeed, not the worst way of testing Pico's own limited holding is to ask what
one would say had the Court decided the case in favor of the school board.
Were a school board to be regarded as unreviewable in designating only such
books as it approved as "suitable" for public school library use, how could
246. 457 US at 860, quoting (with approval) the approach reflected in the court of appeals, 638
F2d at 417. Pico thus had a strong, direct link to Ewing, reviewed in the text accompanying notes 20812. Here, in contrast to Ewing, there was strong evidence that the board was not actually exercising a
good faith judgment at all. Moreover, so far as there had been a review of the particular books on
general grounds of educational suitability (a review that appeared to have been made in good faith),
that review had reached much different conclusions as to most of the books. See note 238.
247. And Pico is an "academic freedom" case, reaching (as it does) the conditions inside
educational institutions, the contents of their libraries, student opportunity of access, and
professional staff judgment in their selection and use, albeit decided on limited first amendment
grounds. In Pico itself, moreover, faculty academic freedom was also implicated directly and not
merely indirectly by the school board's directive ordering removal of the books, especially since the
directive also forbade any curricular use of the same books. See Pico, 457 US at 858 ("As a result [of
the board's actions], the nine removed books could not be assigned or suggested to students in
connection with school work."). Among the plaintiffs' complaints in the case was a complaint quite
the same as that which we examined originally in Baggett, 377 US at 360, that the school board action
infringed on the range of the student's own educational interaction, because the restrictions on those
who taught affected as well those who wished to learn. See Pico, 457 US at 862 n18 (describing the
board actions as "restrictions upon [the teachers'] ability to function as teachers in violation of
principles of academic freedom.").
248. Or, rather, those politically able to dominate that agency, which must then merely stimulate
competition among community groups, in turn, as to whose views shall control. Compare the
opinion of Justice Jackson in Barnette, 319 US at 641: "It seems trite but necessary to say that the
First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these
beginnings."
249. Id at 637.
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one reconcile that rule of law with the first amendment or with any genuine
academic freedom in public schools, and what kind of rule of law would such a
rule be? This is, however, roughly the alternative the majority of the Court in
Pico believed it was confronted with, given evidence in the record of the
assumptions the school board entertained of its prerogatives as well as how it
acted on those assumptions. There is little reason to suggest that the Court
was anything other than correct.
Although Pico dealt with a removal of books from public school libraries, it
is strongly of a piece with cases such as Epperson v. Arkansas and Scopes v.
Tennessee, though Epperson and Scopes were instances of classroom rather than
library censorship. In each, political decisions were at work deliberately to
"contract the spectrum of available knowledge" within the public school. In
each instance, the restriction was sought in order to insulate the ideological
status quo from the distress that is always at risk when academic freedom is
tolerated at any level of education, whether it is applied to certain subjects, to
certain books, or to certain teachers. Scopes and Epperson merely furnished
clear examples. But Pico was also, as the Court properly reviewed it,
essentially the same sort of restriction one step removed.
Scopes and Epperson had dealt with efforts not to ban academic access to
books by modern social anti-establishmentarians such as Kurt Vonnegut or
Langston Hughes, but rather to suppress teaching of Charles Darwin's workeven a century after his original field studies had taken place. And, quite
remarkably, soon after Pico the Supreme Court made still another return to
Charles Darwin and academic freedom in public schools. It did so in 1987, a
date coincidentally marking the bicentennial of the Constitution, twenty years
after Epperson, decided in 1968. The case providing the occasion for a further
review of this seemingly endless feud between science and religion is Edwards
v. Aguillard.250 With Scopes having served as the beginning of our unhurried
review, it is altogether fitting that Edwards v. Aguillard should itself serve as our
end.

25'

250. 482 US 578 (1987).
251. For the sake of completeness (that is, in reporting usages of "academic freedom" in the
Supreme Court), however, mention should be made of one other case in the Supreme Court
adverting to academic freedom during this most recent decade, Memphis Community School Dist. v
Stachura, 477 US 299 (1986). Stachura was a private civil action brought in federal court by a public
school teacher of life sciences after she was suspended by a local school board without a hearing
(albeit with pay). The board had suspended her in hasty response to a local uproar based on
inaccurate reports about two films she had used in her seventh-grade class on human growth and
sexuality. Both films in fact had been provided by the local health department and approved by the
high school principal; so, as it happened-unsurprisingly when due process is ignored-the teacher
was suspended even while conducting her class altogether unexceptionably, that is, exactly in the
manner she was authorized to do. Stachura was hastily reinstated the following fall semester albeit
only after she had filed suit against the school board and its members. Though reinstatement was
thus no longer at issue, she pressed forward with claims for money damages and fared quite well at
trial; the jury awarded her $275,000 in compensatory damages and $46,000 in punitive damages.
Significantly for our purposes, in sustaining her claims as stating proper causes of action, the federal
district court described her first claim as a claim seeking damages for the violation of her right to
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The original legislative anathematizing of Darwin from all of public
education in Tennessee, we recall, was sustained in 1927 on the masterservant view of teachers in public schools. Indeed, in Scopes, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that in respect to tax-supported publicly administered
schools and universities 2 52 the state was simply "unhampered" by the
fourteenth amendment in deciding what was to be taught by those whom it
paid. By 1968 and Epperson, however, as we have already noted, the decisional
law of the first amendment had dramatically changed. The strong protection
of professional academic freedom within public universities and also in some
measure in ordinary public schools had come to be accepted in the Court,
reported in its own usages of academic freedom beginning in the 1950s, in the
course of holding invalid a large number of state restrictions chilling
professional teaching and research. Epperson itself vindicated that freedom in
assuring a high school biology teacher that she could address Darwin in her
2 53
classroom, despite the state's legislated ban.

Even so, despite the Court's decision in Epperson, the ancient contest had
not yet run its course. In 1982, the Louisiana legislature enacted a true
Hobson's choice. If natural science were taught, then the teacher must teach
"creation-science" 254 as well. Teachers could be relieved of the duty to
"academic freedom." (Her other claim sought damages for a violation of her right to due process,
that is, for failure to provide a fair hearing before the complaints against her were acted upon.) The
court of appeals agreed and likewise described the school board's action as one violating her
"academic freedom." Stachura v Truszkowski, 763 F2d 211, 215 (6th Cir 1985). It is just this point
that makes the case appropriately mentionable here: the Supreme Court also used the same term
unexceptionably in describing her right. See, for example, id at 302, 309 (use of the term "academic
freedom"). Stachura is thus a helpful case, marking the identification of teaching freedom-academic
freedom-in first amendment law.
But the matter is not dwelt upon here, because the case was accepted for review in the Supreme
Court only to consider a different point: not to decide whether Stachura's academic freedom was
protected by the first amendment, but, granting that it was, to determine how damages were to be
measured when it is violated by a local school board and its members. The Court agreed that every
form of damage to Stachura (including mental anguish, damage to reputation, lost income and/or
lost teaching opportunities) could figure in the jury's award, including punitive damages as well. It
rejected the idea, however, that additional damages could be awarded on some jury divination of the
intrinsic money worth of a constitutional right per se, an award the district court had allowed. The
case, though a fair argument can be made that such an award is not inappropriate, is nonetheless
unremarkable in its treatment of that feature of claiming damages.
252. Recall that the Tennessee statute involved in Scopes and the Arkansas statute involved in
Epperson applied to all public colleges and state supported universities as well as to public schools.
See notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
253. As we observed, see notes 153-67 and accompanying text, the Court held that insofar as the
banishment of Darwin from the public school (or university) was done to serve interests of a
dominant religion, it was invalid under the first amendment on that account. Nevertheless, Epperson
also stood for a stronger rationale. The concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, as we noted, was not
restricted to a limited establishment clause rationale. In Pico, moreover, Epperson was identified with
Keyishian and other academic freedom cases in the Supreme Court. See, for example, 457 US at 853.
Justice Brennan also described Epperson as a case affirming the duty of courts to intervene where
"essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry." Pico, id at 870,
quoting Epperson, 393 US at 104.
254. "Creation-science" was defined in the statute itself as a belief regarding origins, whether of
chemical elements, galaxies, organisms, species (including man) and all else, that they "were created
ex nihilo and fixed by God." See Creationism Act, La Rev Stat Ann § 17:286.1-286.7 (West 1982).
See also Aguillard, 482 US at 596 ("[Tlhe largest proportion of superintendents interpreted creation
science, as defined by the Act, to mean the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis.").
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provide instruction in "creation-science," that is, only by abstaining from
teaching what the legislature called "evolution-science." The choice,
therefore, was to teach each with the same vigor and attention as the other, or
to teach neither.
The case challenging the Louisiana act was brought in federal district
court by a coalition of teachers, parents, and students. That court, as well as
the court of appeals, meticulously reviewed the legislation, and both
concluded that the actual point of the act was to regulate public school
curricula strictly in behalf of religious interests. The act plainly meant to
compel teachers either to stay away from discussing evolution 2 55 or, failing
that, to offer Bible explanations (called "creationism") as part of ordinary
science, to be inculcated as of equal validity. The court of appeals struck the
act on the same basis as the Arkansas statute had been held invalid in Epperson,
that is, as a violation of the establishment clause. The Supreme Court
agreed.256 In doing so, it added that nothing in its decision should be taken
to "imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of
prevailing scientific theories be taught."2 5 7 But it also registered its firm

agreement with the lower courts that this act was not an act of that permissible
sort.
In deciding Aguillard as it did, moreover, the Court also expressly
addressed the meaning of academic freedom in public education. It
undertook to do so because the Louisiana act purported on its face to have
been enacted not to restrict but rather to protect academic freedom-the
academic freedom of students. 2 58 In response, noting how the act was meant
to work concretely, and agreeing with the elaborate court of appeals' review of

the very question of how academic freedom would in fact be affected, Justice
Brennan quite unremarkably concluded: "The Act actually serves to diminish
academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolution without also
teaching creation-science even if teachers determine that such curriculum
255. The principal sponsor of the law expressly stated as his own strong preference that teachers
say nothing, thus achieving the effect of the law that was invalidated in Epperson. See references and
quotations at 482 US at 587.
256. Aguillard v Treen, 634 F Supp 426, 428 (ED La 1985) aftd, Aguillard v Edwards, 765 F2d 1251,
1257-58 (5th Cir 1985); see 482 US at 593-94 (discussion by Justice Brennan). See also 482 US at
602 (Powell concurring, noting that the material expected to be used in teaching "creation-science"
was expected to come essentially from the Bible as the written word of God, and from materials
supplied by "research" centers in which membership itself, however, required that "a member must
accept 'that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truth.' "); id
at 609 (White concurring) ("[T]he teaching of evolution was conditioned on the teaching of a
religious belief. Both courts concluded that the state legislature's primary purpose was to advance
religion and that the statute was therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.").
257. Id at 593.
258. The effort of the Louisiana legislature to describe the act in these terms, moreover, is itself
extremely instructive of the extent to which the legislature was aware how much conditions had
changed since Scopes. Sixty years earlier, there would have been no need at all to explain or to
account for whatever the legislature decided on such matters. (That, after all, was the essence of
Scopes.) Now, however, given the changes in constitutional doctrine and the virtual certainly of a first
amendment challenge, there was felt need to say something to put a proper face on the matter at
hand. Choosing the explanation of solicitude for "student academic freedom" (learning freedom)
was the best thought the legislature had.
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results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction. '2 59 The court
of appeals had taken the same approach, namely that "[a]cademic freedom
embodies the principal that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that
which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional
judgment. . . . Although states may prescribe public school curriculum
concerning science instruction . . .the compulsion inherent in the Balanced

Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom
as it is universally understood. " 2' 60 The Act, in brief, actually denied one kind
of academic freedom to students insofar as it denied them learning freedom
in the specific sense of access to and the benefit of each teacher's best professional,
goodfaithjudgment, understanding,andskills. It operated in its own way as the Act
reviewed and held invalid in Baggett v. Bullitt.2 6 1 It also operated in the same
manner here as another statute would operate were it to require that one
teaching astronomy either propose no science descriptions at all or propose
Ptolemaic (earth-centered) models as viable science alternatives to
Copernican ideas, that is, to require "balanced treatment" of earth-centered
astronomy for the same reason as "creation-science" was required here (to
confirm "God's plan" according to the Bible).
To be sure, Aguillard was not unanimous and it did divide the Supreme
Court, albeit not by any very close vote. What is more useful about Aguillard,
as a fair way of completing this unhurried review of academic freedom and the
first amendment, however, is not anything in the division of the Court. 26 2 Nor
is it anything that separates it or its useful observations on the meaning and
content of academic freedom from its discussion and decisions in Sweezy,
Baggett, Keyishian, Ewing, Pico and others that lend strong encouragement and
support to academic freedom, whether in universities or in public schools. It
is useful, rather, because overall its treatment of that freedom is in keeping
with these other cases and because it, too, tends to report a far better
understanding of the first amendment imperatives for academic freedom than
characterized the empty doctrines of American constitutional law when
Scopes was a teacher in Tennessee. Today, on the 50th anniversary of the
Joint Statement of Principles and the 200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights,
despite Aguillard, it would still be quite incorrect to suggest that the protection
of academic freedom is now reasonably secure. Assuredly it is not. Still, a
259. 482 US at 586 n6. See also discussion, id at 588-89. The court of appeals had taken the
same approach, namely, that
[a]cademic freedom embodies the principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach
that which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment ....
Although states may prescribe public school curriculum concerning science instruction ...
the compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment Act is, on itsface, inconsistent with the
idea of academic freedom as it is universally understood.
765 F2d at 1257.
260. 765 F2d at 1257.
261. 377 US 360; see notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
262. The case came into court untested in actual application, enabling Scalia (for himself and
Chief Justice Rehnquist) to suggest possibilities of legislative face-saving interpretation, that is,
interpretations as might not impose more than trivially upon those subject to its "balanced
treatment" provisions, according to which it could then be sustained.

154

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 3

number of things have come out nearly right, and the jurisprudence of the
first amendment is vastly better than it once was.

